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The Jury As Constitutional Identity
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson*
The jury once existed at the core of American constitutional identity. At
the founding, jury service and voting were twin political rights, equal in
stature and importance. During the battles for racial equality and gender
equality, advocates explicitly linked demands for voting and jury service
as symbols of constitutional equality. The jury became a democratic,
participatory symbol in our constitutional system, and the juror became a
constitutional actor with constitutional responsibilities. Today, however,
from summons to verdict, modern jurors are largely unaware of this
constitutional connection. Worse, the combination of well-meaning jury
streamlining programs, limiting jury instructions, and a historic shift in
the role of juries has created essentially a “task-oriented” juror. Jurors do
not consider their identity outside of the particular task presented at the
courthouse.
This article examines how we ended up limiting the role of the juror in
society. Particularly, it addresses the loss of constitutional identity and
how jurors no longer view themselves as constitutional actors. This article
then looks to reclaim a sense of constitutional identity. The article argues
that, first, citizens must re-conceptualize “being a juror” as an important,
ongoing, constitutional status, not a discrete task; and, second, citizens
must embrace that being a juror requires engagement before and after the
actual jury duty. Potential citizen-jurors should be encouraged to educate
themselves about the constitutional role of the jury prior to serving.
Experienced jurors who have served should be encouraged to reflect on
and teach others from this experience. Courts and communities should
promote this civic investment in the on-going jury role. So conceived,
being a juror will not begin or end with the actual service, but will be seen
as part of a continuum of civic life.
*
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I have on my desk at this moment twelve five-by-seven ruled
index cards. On each of them the same two words appear: “not
guilty.” . . . The twelve cards represent the potent residue of
the most intense sixty-six hours of my life, a period during
which I served as the foreman of a jury charged to decide
whether Monte Milcray was guilty of murdering Randolph
Cuffee. During that period, twelve individuals of considerable
diversity engaged in a total of twenty-three hours of sustained
conversation in a small, bare room. We ran the gamut of group
dynamics: a clutch of strangers yelled, cursed, rolled on the
floor, vomited, whispered, embraced, sobbed, and invoked
both God and necromancy. . . . During significant stretches in
this trying time, we considered two weeks of testimony . . .
and struggled to understand two things: what happened in
Cuffee’s apartment on the night of August 1, 1998, and what
responsibilities we had as citizens and jurors.
— A Trial By Jury1
INTRODUCTION
In his memoir about his experience as a jury foreman, D. Graham
Burnett isolates the two questions at the center of every jury trial: first,
how should jurors determine the facts and, second, how should jurors
understand their role as citizens in a constitutional democracy. The
duality of fact-finder and participatory citizen has always existed
during jury service.2 Jurors must decide the case, and they must do so
within a special constitutional role.
Today, there is little debate about the first role of the juror as factfinder.3 In every state and federal court in America, jury instructions
guide jurors to find the facts.4 The “role of the jury” instruction has
been standardized to a single task: jurors apply the law to the facts.5
1

D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY 11-13 (2001).
See Chris Kemmitt, Function over Form: Reviving the Criminal Jury’s Historical
Role as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93, 109 (2006).
3
“Today, with a few notable exceptions, it is well-accepted that the judge
instructs the law, and the jury determines the facts in evidence and applies the law as
instructed.” Judge Roger M. Young, Using Social Science to Assess the Need for Jury
Reform in South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. REV. 135, 147 (2000); see Shannon v. United
States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (“The jury’s function is to find the facts and to decide
whether, on those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.”).
4
See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
5
See, e.g., 1-1 ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CRIMINAL § 101 (2d ed.
1994) (“It is your duty to determine the facts from the evidence produced in this trial.
2

1108

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:1105

The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed this limited, taskoriented role in cases dating back over a century.6 The result is that
citizens called to jury service justifiably focus on the discrete,
problem-solving nature of the job.7 For most people, jury service
means going to a particular place (federal or state court) to participate
in a specific event (criminal or civil trial). Jurors do not prepare for it.
Jurors do not consider their role or identity outside of the task
presented at that particular time and place.
In contrast, the second role of the juror as a constitutional actor has
largely been forgotten.8 While court systems promote the abstract ideal
of the participatory citizen, there is little effort to link jury service to
constitutional identity. Inside the court system, from jury summons
through final instructions, jurors are not educated about their historic,
constitutional role.9 Outside of the judicial system, there is almost no
recognition that the identity of the juror might extend beyond the
courthouse.10 The identity of the juror as connected to the broader
constitutional responsibilities of citizenship has been lost.11
The result is precisely the opposite of the jury envisioned by those
who drafted the United States Constitution. At the time of the
founding, jurors were not mere fact-finders, but equal participants in a
constitutional structure of shared power.12 Some Founding Fathers
You are to apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts and render
your verdict upon the evidence and law.”); 1 CHARGES TO JURY AND REQUESTS TO
CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK § 3:2 (2013) (“We are both judges in a very
real sense. I am the judge of the law and you, Ladies and Gentlemen, are the judges of
the facts. I now instruct you that each of you is bound to accept the law as I give it to
you.”).
6
See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 90-91 (1895).
7
See infra Part II.
8
See Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury’s Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 673-74
(2012) (“In drafting the Constitution, the Founders cemented the role of the jury as a
political and constitutional actor.”).
9
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Jury Instructions as Constitutional Education, 84
U. COLO. L. REV. 233, 238 (2013).
10
To be clear, this does not mean that court systems and jury task forces or
commissions have not sought to improve jury service. But that almost all of the efforts
are focused on improving jury service during the time of jury duty, and not before or
after that time.
11
See infra Part II.
12
Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framer’s Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury
Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 893 (2010) (“In short, the
Framers were eager to create a permanent role for juries in the very framework of
America’s new system of government. The Constitution’s text was intended to make
certain that the citizenry could and would serve as an essential check on the exercise
of the powers of government officials in criminal cases.”); Alan Hirsch, Direct
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considered the right to serve as a juror more fundamental to their
constitutional and political identity than the right to vote.13 To identify
as a full citizen meant to be a participating voter and juror. It was a
lifetime status, not an isolated task.14 This understanding of
constitutional identity reappeared in the movements to expand
political rights to those disenfranchised from the original
constitutional promise.15 To be a juror was a symbol of constitutional
equality before and after the debates over the Reconstruction
Amendments and the Nineteenth Amendment.16 Advocates for
constitutional equality risked discrimination, arrest, and death to gain
the right to participate in jury service.17 After the Civil Rights
Movement, the right to serve on a jury became a badge of citizenship,
not because it was necessary to find facts in a particular case, but
because equal participation represented full citizenship.18

Democracy and Civic Maturation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 210 (2002) (“The
Framers recognized that the vote would not be enough to restrain government
officials. Accordingly, the Constitution also gives the People, in their respective roles
as jurors and militia members, crucial responsibility for administering justice and
protecting national security.”).
13
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), reprinted
in 15 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 282, 283 (J. Boyd ed., 1958) (“Were I called upon to
decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary
department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.”).
14
See Kenneth Starr, Luncheon Speech, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 829, 832 (1997) (“From
the pamphleteers of the Revolution to the Antifederalists and to Tocqueville, I think
we can clearly identify roles for the jury going beyond the functional, practical need
for achieving hopefully a just outcome in a particular case. We can thus view the jury
as a check on official power, a way of bringing the public into the judicial branch and
educating the jury, the people, about the law and the values of the rule of law.”). As
will be discussed in detail, a juror’s constitutional identity involved recognition that
jury service: (1) was of equal importance to any of the other political rights in a
democracy; (2) required work and knowledge to prepare for the experience; (3) was
an ongoing responsibility that stretched beyond the actual service on a jury; and (4)
was connected to and reinforced by other parts of the constitutional system.
15
See infra Part I (discussing the history of jury service inclusion).
16
See infra Part I.
17
See infra Part I.B-C.
18
Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413, 1430 n.62, 1485-86 (1991); cf. Reva Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948-49
(2002) (describing how advocates of sex equality sought to recognize women as equal
citizens in the constitutional order). See generally Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502
(1972) (“Illegal and unconstitutional jury selection procedures cast doubt on the
integrity of the whole judicial process. They create the appearance of bias in the
decision of individual cases, and they increase the risk of actual bias as well.”).
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This Article examines how we ended up inverting the role of the
jury in society. Particularly, it addresses the loss of constitutional
identity and why jurors no longer view themselves as constitutional
actors. It argues that this loss of constitutional identity has come at a
cost to the jury’s reputation, its power in the constitutional structure,
its efficiency in processing cases, and its role as an educative
institution. This loss has contributed to a growing apathy toward jury
service, in particular, and the jury, in general. This Article then looks
to reclaim the civic and constitutional identity valued by the Framers
and those who fought for political equality during other constitutional
moments in history. It seeks to broadly reframe the debate to rebuild
the image of the juror in America.
This project of “juror renewal” is urgently needed. In raw numbers,
jury use has decreased in criminal and civil trials.19 Currently,
approximately 95% of criminal cases are resolved short of trial, let
alone a jury trial.20 The number of civil juries has experienced a
similar decline.21 Fewer trials results in fewer citizens identifying as
19
The statistics from federal courts show a slow decline just over the past few
years, but a much larger decline over the last few decades. As but one benchmark for
the decrease in the number of jury trials, the federal courts report annual statistics of
the number of juries selected. A comparison of the last reported five years (2007–
2011) with the reported years from 1993–1997 shows a significant decrease. Compare
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2011, at 44 tbl.S-15, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/tables/S15Sep11.pdf
(showing a decline from 6,193 juries selected in 2007 to 5,565 juries selected in
2011), with U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 1997, at 62 tbl.S-17,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/1997/tables/
s17sep97.pdf (showing a decline from 11,112 juries selected in 1993 to 9,771 juries
selected in 1997). As one judge recently summarized: “In 1962, there were about
5,800 civil trials in the federal district courts. In 2004, there were only about 4,000
civil trials, despite the fact that five times as many cases were filed. . . . The same story
is playing out in the state courts. The available data shows that the number of jury
trials fell by one-third between 1976 and 2002, with less than 1% of cases being
disposed of by a jury in 2002.” Hon. Jennifer Walker Elrod, Is the Jury Still Out?: A
Case for the Continued Viability of the American Jury, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 303, 318-19
(2012); see also Scott Brister, The Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47
S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 208-11 (2005).
20
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 n.13 (2011); see also T. Ward Frampton,
The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury Trial Rates Vary By State, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 183, 190 n.46 (2012) (“Overall, for the period 1976–2002, the number
of criminal jury trials has declined by 15 percent (from 42,049 to 35,664) while the
number of bench trials has declined by 10 percent (from 61,382 to 55,447).” (quoting
Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 755, 764 (2004))).
21
Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 9 (“In the [state]
courts of general jurisdiction of 22 states (and the District of Columbia) that contain
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jurors. In addition, a number of high profile criminal acquittals and
excessive civil damage awards have led to sensationalized media
coverage demonizing the jury.22 This, in turn, has led to direct attacks
on jurors as being incompetent or erratic.23 These cases, encouraged
by interests seeking to reduce litigation expenses from tort and classaction lawsuits, have resulted in several decades of negative juror
stories.24 While numerous studies and scholars have warned about the
“vanishing trial,” few have concerned themselves with the “vanishing
juror.”25
To fulfill this project of juror renewal, this Article proposes a new
way of viewing jury service — not simply as a task to be completed, but
as an ongoing constitutional identity. Being a juror is a status like being
a voter or elected official.26 It suggests embracing the “potentiality of
58 percent of the U.S. population, the portion of cases reaching jury trial declined
from 1.8 percent of dispositions in 1976 to 0.6 percent in 2002 . . . . The absolute
number of jury trials is down by one-third.”); see also id. at 10 (“On the criminal side,
the trial rate has moved in the same direction in the state courts as in the federal
courts. From 1976 to 2002, the overall rate of criminal trials in courts of general
jurisdiction in the 22 states for which data is available dropped from 8.5 percent of
dispositions to 3.3 percent.”).
22
For example, the murder prosecution of O.J. Simpson brought national
attention to what many thought was an incorrect criminal verdict. High damages
actions in cases involving consumer lawsuits, like the McDonald’s hot coffee lawsuit,
have brought attention to tort suits. See Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury
Decided that a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1.
23
See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from
Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 733 (1991) (“Chief Justice Warren Burger of
the United States Supreme Court led the critics, suggesting that jurors lack the
abilities required to deal with the complex issues often presented in federal civil
trials.”); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy,
6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 790 (2000) (cataloging public criticism of juries in
America).
24
Michael Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found in the
Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 231 (1998) (“Daniel Bailis and Robert MacCoun’s
content analysis of several major publications reveals that their choice of stories to
report systematically distorts the impression created of the types of cases that are
litigated and the outcomes of the cases, especially the amounts awarded.” (citing
Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as Your
Guide, 80 JUDICATURE 64, 64-67 (1996))).
25
Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255-56 (2005); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L.
STUD. 459, 461 (2004); Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know
About American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 35, 36; Hon. William G. Young,
Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 89
(2006).
26
Traditionally, voting, jury service, and being elected to public office were
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jury service” — a shift in perception that focuses on the juror beyond
just the moments in the courthouse. Right now, assuming other
qualifications, most adult citizens are potential jurors.27 Before jury
service, those citizens were potential jurors. After jury service, those
citizens are again potential jurors. Yet, most citizens do not consider
that there is any ongoing juror role outside the courthouse. No one
prepares for jury service.28 Few citizens engage the court after their jury
service ends. The potentiality of jury service confronts this limited
conception of being a juror. It broadens the focus along a continuum of
civic life. It also recognizes that this potential status requires some
action on our part — primarily education and reflection — to prepare
for this constitutional responsibility. In developing this constitutional
awareness about the jury, citizens will be able to reclaim a sense of
constitutional identity that will strengthen the reputation, efficiency,
and institution of the jury.29
This Article builds on numerous scholarly critiques of the limited,
fact-finding role of the jury.30 In recent years, scholars have called for a
greater jury role in legal interpretation,31 sentencing,32 habeas corpus,33
considered the core political rights in the U.S. Constitution. See Cristina M.
Rodríguez, Clearing the Smoke-Filled Room: Women Jurors and the Disruption of an OldBoys’ Network in Nineteenth-Century America, 108 YALE L.J. 1805, 1834-36 (1999).
27
See generally Juror Qualifications, Exemptions and Excuses, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JuryService/JurorQualifications.aspx (last visited
Dec. 26, 2013).
28
From the perspective of the litigant whose life or property interests are at stake,
this lack of preparation represents a remarkable lack of foresight on the part of the
juror. After all, before that particular jury was selected, each one of those citizens was
a potential juror. We are all potential jurors every day of our lives. Yet, we
compartmentalize this constitutional duty and minimize a core constitutional
responsibility to the detriment of the legal system.
29
See infra Part III.
30
See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 57 (2003) (discussing
the jury’s fact-finding role during sentencing); Jon P. McClanahan, The ‘True Right’ to
Trial by Jury: The Founders Formulation and Its Demise, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 791, 795
(2009) [hereinafter True Right] (scrutinizing the historical evolution of the jury’s
ability to decide legal issues); Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson’s
Jury: Sparf and Hansen v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353, 354
(2004) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Sparf and its effect on the role of
the jury); Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 441 (1996) (examining modifications that would enhance the
jury’s fact-finding role).
31
Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role of Juries in Eighth
Amendment Punishments Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REV. 549, 583 (2012).
32
Barkow, supra note 30, at 48-65; Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic
Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 322 (2003).
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and even judging the morality of certain criminal laws.34 Much of the
focus has been on the lost “law-finding” or “law interpreting” role of
the jury.35 Left unexamined, however, has been how relatively recent
changes to reduce the burden on jurors, to streamline the jury
selection process, and to make jury service more user-friendly have
also affected the constitutional identity of jurors.36 This Article seeks
to trace how this increasingly limited role for juries has negatively
impacted constitutional identity.
Part I explores the idea of constitutional identity — of how being a
juror became intertwined with the status of being a citizen. This role
begins at the founding with clear expressions of the connection
between juror and citizen in the constitutional debates. As Alexis de
Tocqueville famously observed on the value of jurors, “It would be a
very narrow view to look upon the jury as a mere judicial institution;
for however great its influence may be upon the decisions of the
courts, it is still greater on the destinies of society at large.”37 This
original understanding reappears at other constitutional moments
including the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, the
Nineteenth Amendment, and throughout Supreme Court cases
addressing the importance of juror participation.38
Part II sets out the contrasting modern reality of a task-oriented
jury. Over the last century, several important, and in many cases
beneficial, developments have shaped the role of juries. First, court
opinions have reduced the responsibilities of juries in deciding legal
issues.39 The broad powers of Founding Era juries have been limited to
33

Berman, supra note 12, at 891.
Carroll, supra note 8, at 663 (redefining the term nullification post-Apprendi);
Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the
Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433-34 (1998); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the
Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 880 (1999) [hereinafter Myth of the Nullifying
Jury]; Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice, 62
U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1392 (1994).
35
Raoul Berger, Justice Samuel Chase v. Thomas Jefferson: A Response to Stephen
Presser, 1990 BYU L. REV. 873, 889-90; Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding
Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 377, 379; Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries
as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 584 (1939).
36
See infra Part II.
37
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., 1945) (1838).
38
See infra Part I.B.
39
See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (emphasizing the
jury’s role as a fact-finder while largely dismissing the jury’s role in sentencing). But
see United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 407-08 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(documenting several cases in which courts acknowledged the jury’s formerly
34
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much more restricted tasks.40 Second, formalized jury instructions
have reinforced this task-oriented role. Jurors are now almost
uniformly instructed about their limited role during jury trials.41 In
addition, court systems have sought to reduce the burden on potential
jurors. In recent decades, programs such as “one day, one trial” have
been adopted by many states.42 Court systems have curtailed
professional exemptions and broadened the jury pools, expanding the
jury venire and dispersing the burdens of serving.43 Jurors have
internalized these improvements, with a begrudging acceptance that
they are willing to do their civic duty as long as it is not too time
consuming. The unanticipated result of these otherwise positive jury
improvements, however, is that potential jurors approach jury service
with an understanding that their task is limited in scope, time, and
role.44 Jurors now see their jobs as functional, not formative.
Part III sets out the theory of “the potentiality of jury service” in an
attempt to reclaim the constitutional identity of jury service within a
modern jury system. Primarily, it looks to the educative potential in
thinking about jury duty in preparation for the actual service. The
potentiality of jury service involves two component parts: first, a reconceptualization of jury service as an important, ongoing,
constitutional status, not a discrete task; and second, recognition that
because being a juror is an ongoing identity, it requires ongoing
investment in terms of education and reflection before and after the
actual moments in the courthouse. Changing the expectations of jury
identity offers several concrete benefits, including improving
constitutional literacy and legal knowledge, strengthening democratic
practice and engagement, uplifting the image of the juror and the

predominant power to control verdicts and sentences).
40
McClanahan, True Right, supra note 30, at 799; Middlebrooks, supra note 30, at 354.
41
See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 451 (2006) [hereinafter Bringing Jury Instructions]
(discussing the widespread use of formalized jury instructions); Peter Tiersma, The
Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 1081, 1102-03 (2001) (describing the role of defining technical terminology
during the jury instruction process).
42
Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79 JUDICATURE
216, 217 (1996).
43
Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception and Politics
of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 355 (1996); see Nancy S. Marder,
Introduction to the Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
909, 922-23 (2003) [hereinafter Introduction to the Jury].
44
See infra Part II.
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institution of the jury, and opening up a dialogue about other ways to
encourage civic engagement.45
Finally, Part IV offers a brief conclusion that in order to improve
jury service, a new understanding of juror identity is necessary. By reconceiving jury service to reflect a broader constitutional role, courts
and citizens can reclaim the power of the juror in America.
I.

A CONSTITUTIONALLY-ORIENTED JUROR

The juror was a central figure in the creation of America. As
individual hero,46 collective voice of protest,47 or part of an institution
that symbolized a democratic, local, and leveling power, jurors
intertwined themselves with the American character.48 The United
States Constitution was, after all, not simply the founding charter for a
government, but also a statement of American identity.49 The
“American juror” began as an archetype, representing an independent
participant in a community-centered institution.50 Part myth, part
aspiration, the juror-as-active-citizen ideal has been held up as an
example that self-government can work.51 While this ideal has been
45

See infra Part III.
WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S ORIGINS,
TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 70 (2002); see JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 25 (1994); Joe
Jamail, The Presentation of an Ethical Jury Trial, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 357, 363-64 (2005)
(discussing the history of the Bushel trial).
47
See William R. Glendon, The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 48, 49
(1996).
48
See Cecil et al., supra note 23, at 728 (“Lay participation in debates concerning
public policies is a touchstone of a democracy. The Constitution enshrines this value
not only by providing for a system of elected representatives, but also by recognizing
the right to trial by jury.”); Young, supra note 25, at 69 (“No other legal institution
sheds greater insight into the character of American justice.”).
49
See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE IDEA THAT IS AMERICA 1-5 (2007).
50
Andrew G. Deiss, Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial Jury in a Pluralist
America, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 323, 333-34 (1996).
51
See Robert Mark Savage, Where Subjects Were Citizens: The Emergence of a
Republican Language and Polity in Colonial American Law Court Culture, 1750–
1776, at 4 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University), available at
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:131400 (“Americans believed their
juries to possess, inherently, a republican character. Juries continued to embody the
voices of ‘the people,’ broadly speaking, within the machinery of the state. This
republican character of the American jury held such attraction that, by the 1830s, the
power of the jury had already become enshrined in national memory as both a
political weapon and as a means of community coherence, as well as a potent symbol
of liberty itself.”); id. at 48 (“Colonial law court culture was about teaching colonists
how to participate in the construction, legitimization and use of power. The lessons
46
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undercut by a history of exclusion and unfair application, the sense
that the jury is a uniquely democratic institution remains a recurring
theme in cases and commentary about the American legal system.52
Jury trials, of course, predated the United States Constitution, but
their almost universal acceptance in the colonies53 and then the newly
formed states54 made them a central point of agreement in establishing
the constitutional principles of government.55 Juries served as a
reminder that citizens were the ultimate decision-makers in a
democratic society.56 In parallel importance to the other democratic
rights of voting and serving as an elected official, jury service was a
responsibility that required on-going engagement, education, and an
understanding of the constitutional structure.
This section attempts to show that jury service was part of a
constitutional identity in three different eras: the framing of the
United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction
Amendments through the Civil Rights Movement, and before and after
the Nineteenth Amendment. In each case, those drafting or seeking to
amend the Constitution considered jury service directly connected to
constitutional identity.
A. The Founding Era and Beyond
An analysis of the jury as constitutional identity must begin with the
language of the United States Constitution. Textually, the jury stands
alone in its prominence.57 The right to a criminal jury trial is the only
learned in that ‘school’ — in that law court culture — could transform the people
involved. In particular, colonial court culture offered an opportunity for subjects to
act as citizens.”).
52
See infra Part II.B-C.
53
See Jack Pope, The Jury, 39 TEX. L. REV. 426, 445 (1961) (recognizing that the
jury trial came over with the colonists of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641);
Smith, supra note 30, at 423-24.
54
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870 (1994).
55
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 509 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., Bantam
Books 2003) (1788) (“The friends and adversaries of the plan of the [Constitutional]
convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the
trial by jury: Or if there is any difference between them, it consists in this; the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as the very palladium
of free government.”).
56
For more on the central role of juries at the founding, see Ferguson, supra note
9, at 242-53.
57
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See generally NEIL VIDMAR &
VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 80 (2007) (noting the similar
treatment of the right to vote and the right to serve as a juror for persons with felony
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constitutional right to be included in both the original text and the Bill
of Rights.58 The initial failure to include an explicit right to a civil jury
trial almost defeated constitutional ratification, as the Anti-Federalists
took this omission as portending a new form of tyranny.59 Thus, the
Seventh Amendment’s right to a civil jury complements the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a criminal jury, and the Fifth Amendment’s
right to indictment by Grand Jury.60 As Akhil Amar has written, “If we
seek a paradigmatic image underlying the Bill of Rights, we cannot go
far wrong in picking the jury. Not only was it featured in three
separate amendments (the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh), but its absence
strongly influenced the judge-restricting doctrines underlying three
other amendments (the First, Fourth, and Eighth).”61 This textual
influence was not by accident, as the history and symbolism of the
jury led those drafting the Constitution to agree on its central place in
the constitutional structure.62
As a historic matter, juries had been well accepted in the colonies
and the states.63 While varying in use and prestige, all jurisdictions
had a jury system.64 Further, because of the restrictive qualifications
for jury service limited by race, gender, and class, those white, male,
property-owning citizens served to elevate the status of jurors.65 As
some scholars have recognized, the founding juror was also quite
literally the same person one might elect to be a local or state
representative or be in a leadership position in the community.66 The
convictions); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 114 (1986)
(contrasting how deeply imbedded the right to a jury trial is in the United States in
contrast with England, Canada, and other countries).
58
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
59
Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 289, 292 (1966); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an
Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 598 (1993).
60
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190
(1991).
61
Id.
62
See Berman, supra note 12, at 893; Hirsch, supra note 12, at 210; Starr, supra note
14, at 832; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux, supra note 13, at 283.
63
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 54, at 871 n.17 (describing the variation in jury
use in the colonies).
64
Id.
65
Gene Schaerr & Jed Brinton, Business and Jury Trials: The Framers’ Vision Versus
Modern Reality, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1064 (2010) (“At the time the Sixth
Amendment was ratified, jury service was limited to men in every state; and in every
state but Vermont, jury service was also limited to property owners or taxpayers.”).
66
Savage, supra note 51, at 61 (“[T]he evidence suggests that jury service
frequently was a steppingstone to further social and political responsibility, beginning
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jury was considered an equal governing institution, in part because it
was populated by the same sort of people in the actual governing
institutions.67 Jurors were thus linked to political power, which in
early America was seen as citizen-based constitutional power.
Symbolically, this role resonated with a new American self-image.68
Juries had played a role in the American Revolution, with colonial
juries nullifying British prosecutions and protecting American
interests.69 The denial of the right to a jury trial even made it into the
list of grievances against the British Crown in the Declaration of
Independence.70 For a new government predicated on democratic selfgovernment and motivated by a fear of arbitrary central power, the
jury as a local, citizen-based institution had much appeal.71 Juries were
participatory, predicated on equality and due process, and devoted to
protecting accountability and liberty.72 These values were
constitutional values, and this identity of what it meant to be a
constitutional citizen became associated with jury service.73
in the early public lives of these men.”).
67
Brent Tarter & Wythe Holt, The Apparent Political Selection of Federal Grand
Juries in Virginia, 1789–1901, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 263 (2007) (“Full
biographical details are not available for all of the grand jurors, but it is evident that
the grand jury members were on the whole more respectable than representative.
Every grand jury included several men who were or recently had been members of
Virginia’s General Assembly or of Congress, and more than a few served prominently
in one or the other legislative body or as governor after they were on the grand jury.”).
This provides a real insight about why the Founder’s might have trusted grand juries.
If you had the people who were not only of the caliber to be elected representatives,
but were in fact elected representatives, you make it easier to delegate authority to
them. Id. at 263-65 (listing the family backgrounds of the first grand jurors).
68
See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
614-15 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1998) (1969).
69
McClanahan, True Right, supra note 30, at 799-800 (“As the struggle between
Britain and colonial America escalated in the time leading up to the Revolution,
colonial juries played a vital role in mounting opposition to oppressive British
control. . . . Colonial juries, equipped with this relatively unchecked power to render
general verdicts, refused to convict defendants accused of violating British laws, in
particular those involving seditious libel and trade restrictions.”).
70
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
71
See generally Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84
IND. L.J. 397 (2009) (describing the jury system and its historical appeal).
72
See ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 6-7 (2013).
73
Schaerr & Brinton, supra note 65, at 1055-56 (“During the Founding Period,
the right to jury trial enjoyed a level of esteem bordering on religious reverence. As
one delegate to Virginia’s convention considering ratification of the federal
Constitution put it, that right was generally regarded as an ‘inestimable privilege, the
most important which freemen can enjoy[.]’” (citing Journal Notes of the Virginia
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In fact, some Anti-Federalists argued that the right to a jury was
even more central to the new government than the right to vote.74 This
sentiment was echoed by Thomas Jefferson and others who felt that
the jurors’ influence on the judicial system was more critical to
democratic freedoms than the voters’ influence on the legislature.75 In
the hierarchy of political rights, the jury trumped voting in
importance.
From this beginning, jury service became a valued civil76 and
political right.77 Legally, it became a definitional part of the identity of
an American citizen.78 To be a full citizen meant to accept the
constitutional rights and responsibilities of citizenship.79 These
definitions, identifying citizens and excluding others, while negative
in many ways, did have the effect of linking jury service and
constitutional rights.80
Ratification Convention Proceedings (June 24, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1494 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare
J. Saladino eds., 1993))).
74
“The trial by jury is . . . more necessary than representatives in the legislature;
for those usurpations, which silently undermine the spirit of liberty, under the
sanction of law, are more dangerous than direct and open legislative attacks . . . .”
Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 203, 220-21 (1995) [hereinafter Jury Service] (quoting Essays by a Farmer
(IV), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 36, 38 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981); see Barkow, supra note 30, at 56 (“The Maryland Farmer, an Anti-Federalist,
described the jury as ‘the democratic branch of the judiciary power — more necessary
than representatives in the legislature.’”).
75
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux, supra note 13.
76
See Barkow, supra note 30, at 54 (“‘For Americans after the Revolution, as well
as before, the right to trial by jury was probably the most valued of all civil rights.’”
(quoting WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 96 (1994))).
77
See Amar, Jury Service, supra note 74, at 204 (arguing that “jury service, like
voting and office holding, was conceived of as a political right”).
78
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 54, at 877-78 (“Even before the triumph of
universal suffrage, at least half and perhaps three-quarters of the white adult male
population were qualified to vote. Most, though not all, of these voters were probably
eligible for jury service as well.”).
79
See Tarter & Holt, supra note 67, at 257 (“Juries were understood to be the
most intimate and useful way in which citizens took part in their own governance, in
the adjudication of civil and criminal controversies.”); see also Amar, Jury Service,
supra note 74, at 218 (“Jury service was understood at the time of the founding by
leaders on all sides of the ratification debate as one of the fundamental prerequisites to
majoritarian self-government.”).
80
See Deiss, supra note 50, at 349 (“In the United States jury service has long been
linked to the right to vote: from at least the late nineteenth century, state officials have
used lists of registered voters to identify qualified jurors, and qualifications for jury
service often paralleled those for suffrage. For example, both jurors and voters were
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Finally, in creating the ground rules for democratic government, the
Constitution also created expectations for citizens in that democratic
republic. Citizenship meant active participation.81 Active participation
itself entailed understanding the role to be played in the constitutional
structure.82 Since founding jurors had lived through the Framing Era,
they were familiar with the structural role of the jury as it had been
debated for a generation.83 In addition, it was recognized that the jury
would serve as a place of continuing education about legal and
constitutional matters necessary for that active citizenry.84 Citizens
would bring differing understandings about law, share it with other
citizens, learn more, and then bring that enriched legal and
constitutional knowledge back to their communities.85 As Alexis de
Tocqueville famously observed, the jury was a free “public school”
where citizens could learn and practice their constitutional rights.86
Like school, the learning would not all take place in the courthouse
building, but would provide the lessons for a lifetime of civic
participation.87 Like formal education, this participatory process
would shape a civic identity.
required to be freeholders. Generally, however, jury statutes made the pool of
potential jurors shallower than the reservoir of voters by adding requirements of good
character, sobriety, intelligence, and the like.”); see also Amar, Jury Service, supra note
74, at 205 (“[J]ury service eligibility historically has been tied to voter registration as a
general matter.”).
81
See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 33 (2006).
82
Savage, supra note 51, at 58-59 (“In Tocqueville’s view, the jury’s main
pedagogical function was to ‘instill some of the habits of the judicial mind into every
citizen, and just those habits are the very best way of preparing people to be free.’ In
essence, here was the foundation of citizenship, laid by late-colonial American law
court culture and its jurors — in the civic education of early Americans.”).
83
See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-07 (2004).
84
See McClanahan, True Right, supra note 30, at 807 (“According to the Federal
Farmer, service on a jury was the ‘means by which the people are let into the
knowledge of public affairs — are enabled to stand as the guardians of each others
rights, and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those who otherwise might
infringe upon them.’” (quoting Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 320 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981))).
85
See Daniel D. Blinka, Trial by Jury on the Eve of Revolution: The Virginia
Experience, 71 UMKC L. REV. 529, 562 (2003).
86
See 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 285 (“The jury contributes powerfully to
form the judgment and to increase the natural intelligence of a people; and this, in my
opinion, is its greatest advantage. It may be regarded as a gratuitous public school,
ever open, in which every juror learns his rights . . . .”).
87
See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on Juries, 91 JUDICATURE 226,
227, 230 (2008) (“Jury service itself educates the public about the law and the legal
system and produces more positive views of the courts. What is more, jury service can
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As can be seen, textually, historically, symbolically, legally, and
practically, the juror became connected with the constitutional
identity of America. This identity was participatory, engaged, and
required constitutional understanding. In addition, it recognized that
the jury was a space to engage constitutional principles, but it was not
limited to that space. Jury service was but one of many participatory
spaces to foster constitutional action.88 And, while of course, the
founding jury sanctioned exclusion based on race, gender, and class,
those barriers became the focus of advocates seeking to correct the
original discrimination to claim full constitutional identity.89 These
movements for equality are discussed in the next two sections.
B. The Reconstruction Era and Beyond
To simplify a complex and contested historical debate, the
Reconstruction Amendments were, at base, about extending civil and
political rights.90 The prevailing thinking is that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed civil rights, precluding the caste-like
apartheid of the post-Civil War South,91 and the Fifteenth Amendment
guaranteed political rights including the right to vote, serve on juries,
and hold elected office.92 Exactly to whom those rights were granted,
and exactly where the line between civil and political rights should be
increase other forms of civic participation such as voting. Research done by the Jury
and Democracy Project has discovered that citizens who vote only infrequently and
then deliberate with fellow citizens in criminal jury trials are subsequently more likely
to vote.” (citation omitted)); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 3, 7 (1966) (noting the American jury “provides an important civic experience
for the citizen”).
88
See Savage, supra note 51, at 69-70 (“[I]n Virginia as in Massachusetts, jury
service was also a typical preparation for higher public service. Jury duty introduced
the king’s subjects to great responsibility and gave them sometimes enormous
decision-making authority . . . . Jury service often was the first step toward larger
social and political responsibility, giving men immediate authority over the lives and
property of others, within the colonial law court culture.”).
89
See infra Part I.B.
90
See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination,
90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 71 (2011) (“Traditionally, political rights were thought to be those
concerned with governance: voting, jury service, and holding office. . . . Political
rights were bestowed on select citizens with especially good judgment; civil rights, on
the other hand, were the natural rights to which every person, or at least every citizen
including even children, was entitled.”).
91
Id. at 74-75 (“The prevailing understanding in 1868 was that Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal civil rights, but it did not touch the subject
of political rights, which remained the province of the states. Congressmen and
senators expressed this view repeatedly.”).
92
Id.
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drawn, is still debated by scholars.93 For our purposes, this section
takes a portion of the debate and looks at how jury service — as one of
those rights — was connected to the movement for constitutional
change before and after the Reconstruction Amendments.94 As will be
argued, the fight for racial equality was framed in terms of a struggle
for equal constitutional status, including being a juror.
While it soon became part of the bundle of political rights granted
by the Fifteenth Amendment, jury service initially was a central point
of contention during the Reconstruction Era.95 Proponents of the
Reconstruction Amendments were required to finesse furthering the
cause of equality with the practicalities of a racially-divided country.96
93
Note that there has been considerable academic debate about whether the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to serve on a jury. Benno C. Schmidt,
Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West
Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1423 (1983) (“The right to serve on juries without
racial discrimination was conspicuous by its absence in the 1866 Act, leading
proponents of the narrow ‘civil-rights-only’ scope of the fourteenth
amendment . . . .”). But see id. at 1425-26 (“The language of the Act could easily be
read to embrace jury service. The 1866 Act itself was broader than its enumeration.
Thus, even if it were accepted that section one of the fourteenth amendment
guaranteed only the civil rights covered by the 1866 Act, it by no means follows that
only the specifically enumerated rights were covered. The Act, after all, follows its
enumeration with broad language guaranteeing ‘full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.’”).
94
See Amar, Jury Service, supra note 74, at 206 (“[T]he voting-jury service linkage
was recognized by the Framers in the 1780s, by those responsible for drafting the
reconstruction amendments and implementing legislation, and still later by authors of
twentieth century amendments that protect various groups against discrimination in
voting. Moreover, each of the groups the Supreme Court has already determined
should be protected against discrimination in jury service is also protected by one of
the voting discrimination amendments.”).
95
Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights,
50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 916-17 (1998) (arguing that “the architects of the
Reconstruction Amendments linked voting and jury service textually, conceptually,
and historically and that these two should therefore be seen as part of a package of
political rights and should be treated similarly for many constitutional purposes”); see
James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 910-14
(2004) (recognizing that the need for African-Americans on juries was discussed in
the debates over the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments). But see Michael J.
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 238
(1991) (“It is unclear whether the Reconstruction amendments’ drafters intended to
prohibit racial discrimination in jury service, as they plainly did with regard to
property ownership and voting; yet blacks’ right to serve on juries quickly was
guaranteed by the Reconstruction Congress and then was endorsed resoundingly by
the Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia.”).
96
See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 191 (2004) (recognizing that those seeking
passage of the early Reconstruction Amendments walked a delicate line, promoting
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Most early debates completely ignored the jury issue for fear of
political backlash.97 Later debates, informed by the experience of
communities experimenting with racially mixed juries,98 argued for
jury service to be included as part of the promise of constitutional
equality.99
Post-Reconstruction, there were moments of progress where
African-Americans served on juries.100 “Almost one-third of the
citizens called for grand jury service in New Orleans between 1872
and 1878 were African-Americans — a percentage that matched the
percentage of African-Americans in the population of Orleans Parish
generally.”101 Briefly in the Upper Piedmont area of South Carolina,
African-Americans could serve on juries and be represented in jury
pools.102 But, these fleeting moments of equality were the exception,
not the rule.
That jury service remained a central issue of debate can be seen both
by those who used the prospect of racially mixed juries as a political
argument against the Reconstruction Amendments, as well as those
who sought to claim the mantle of supporting African-American
equality but not spelling out what equality would mean).
97
Forman, supra note 95, at 912 (discussing the explicit reluctance of Congress to
project the right for African-Americans to serve on juries before the Reconstruction
Amendments: “These early [Congressional] debates are especially interesting for what
was not argued. Nobody disputed that it would be inappropriate for Congress to grant
blacks the right to serve on juries. The debate turned instead on whether the bill made
sufficiently clear that it was not conferring such a right.”).
98
See JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 156 (1997) (recognizing that in
Virginia, during Reconstruction African-Americans served on juries, but also that after
Virginia was restored to the Union, and despite Federal court efforts, AfricanAmericans were excluded from jury service); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 54, at 886
(“During Reconstruction, African-Americans in some jurisdictions regularly served on
juries.”); Forman, supra note 95, at 930 (“In Washington County, Texas, where blacks
were approximately 50% of the population, blacks constituted about 30% of those
who served on juries between 1870 and 1884.”).
99
Forman, supra note 95, at 927 (quoting Vermont Republican Senator George
Edmunds, “What, sir, is more necessary to peace and security in the administration of
justice in the southern States . . . than that [colored people] should have the
constitutional right to participate in the administration of justice?”).
100
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 102 (2010); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 54, at 886 (“In 1867, the
military commander of South Carolina declared every taxpayer or registered voter to
be eligible for jury service. Since the military itself had registered virtually every adult
African-American male, integrated juries became common in this district.”).
101
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 54, at 886.
102
W.J. MEGGINSON, AFRICAN-AMERICAN LIFE IN UPPER PIEDMONT SOUTH CAROLINA
1870–1900, at 284 (2006).
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equality.103 For example, during the Virginia Constitutional
Convention of 1868, Virginia Representative “Charles Porter
introduced a resolution, stating that voting, office-holding and jury
service should be open to all. He declared that jury-service was a
right.”104 These debates responded to African-American leaders who
had directly advocated for jury rights as a symbol of equal rights.105 As
the Reverend James W. Hood argued after the Civil War, the priorities
for constitutional equality were the right to testify, the right to serve
on a jury, and then the right to vote:
First, the right to testify in courts of justice, in order that we
may defend our property and our rights. Secondly,
representation in the jury box. It is the right of every man
accused of any offence, to be tried by a jury of his peers . . . .
Thirdly and finally, the black man should have the right to
carry his ballot to the ballot box.106
While these arguments did not carry the day into a clear statement of
juror equality in the text of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments,
the principles created the framework for such an understanding.
In fact, it took only a few short years after the passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment to strike down most formal, legal restrictions
forbidding African-Americans from serving on juries.107 A general
agreement emerged (at least in terms of constitutional principle, if not
practice) that the Fifteenth Amendment protected the right to serve on
juries regardless of race.108 Once the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was
passed forbidding jury discrimination in the states (and thus implicitly
allowing all races to sit on juries), the connection between jury service
103
See JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY: CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW 51 (2006) (detailing how jury service was tied

up with suffrage both in a positive way in that it was argued that voting
enfranchisement meant access to jury service, but also in a negative way in that the
prospect of African-Americans on juries was an argument against enfranchisement).
104
HAMILTON JAMES ECKENRODE, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA DURING
RECONSTRUCTION 96 (J.M. Vincent et al. eds., 1904).
105
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 54, at 886.
106
Id. at 886 (citing LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH
OF SLAVERY 505 (1980)).
107
See RANNEY, supra note 103, at 51 (finding that most restrictions of AfricanAmericans in the laws of Southern states were removed by 1870).
108
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 274
(1998); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 30 (2004) (finding that especially after the passage
of the Fifteenth Amendment the understanding that political equality included jury
service was embraced.).
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and constitutional equality was complete.109 The Supreme Court
emphatically reaffirmed this vision with sweeping language in Strauder
v. West Virginia,110 declaring racial discrimination in jury service a
constitutional violation. As the Court stated:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration
of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are
citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is
practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion
of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice
which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race
that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed to every citizen of
West Virginia by the Constitution of that State, and the
constitution of juries is a very essential part of the protection
such a mode of trial is intended to secure.111
Jury service became a recognized badge of citizenship,112 an identity
that conveyed constitutional status.113
As is well known, the ideal of equality quickly faltered in practice,
and new barriers to jury participation emerged.114 Most juries in the
South remained all-white.115 Even in Midwest states, the situation was
109
Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1168 (2011).
110
100 U.S. 303, 305-07 (1880).
111
Id. at 308.
112
Marder, Introduction to the Jury, supra note 43, at 921 (“For African-American
men and all women, who were excluded from jury service for much of our country’s
past, jury duty now takes on added meaning. For those who once were excluded but
who now can serve, jury duty is a hard-won badge of citizenship; it is an indicia of
belonging and of counting as a citizen.”).
113
Amar & Brownstein, supra note 95, at 924 (“Access to ballots, juries, and offices
was, in this sense, a mark of respect and belonging. An individual entitled to vote
shared sovereignty on an equal basis with his fellow citizens.”); Robin Morris Collin,
Brown and Me: Brown’s Theory of an Educational Remedy for Citizenship, 9 HOW. SCROLL
SOC. JUST. L. REV. 73, 82 (2006) (“Citizenship allows democratic participation in the
exercise of government. In the most basic sense, citizenship means the ability to
exercise political rights. A democracy based upon pluralism requires dialogue across
cultural, class and other differences.”); Ariela Gross, “Of Portuguese Origin”: Litigating
Identity and Citizenship Among the “Little Races” in Nineteenth-Century America, 25 LAW
& HIST. REV. 467, 469 (2007).
114
See Forman, supra note 95, at 915-17 (2004).
115
ABRAMSON, supra note 46, 109 (noting that in one Kentucky county in 1938, no
African-American had been summoned for jury duty (grand or petit) for thirty-two
years, even though one-sixth of the population was African-American and in
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not much better.116 Many jurisdictions did not see racial progress for
many, many decades.117 In fact, in certain cases, juries remained
instruments of oppression and injustice, as racial discrimination tilted
verdicts against minorities.118
Despite decades of unfair practice, juries remained a potent symbol
of constitutional equality.119 Jury service became one of the central
battlegrounds in the legal campaign to challenge desegregation laws.120
The National Association of Colored People, Legal Defense Fund
(NAACP-LDF) chose discriminatory jury practices to lead its litigation
strategy in the South.121 Charles Hamilton Houston, the architect of
the civil rights moment won his first Supreme Court case on a jury
discrimination challenge.122 The civil rights leaders succeeded in
getting the Federal Jury Selection Act of 1968 passed, which
reaffirmed the policy of the United States that “all citizens shall have
the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries
in the district courts of the United States, and shall have an obligation

Mississippi, a county had qualified only 25 out of 12,511 African-Americans for jury
service, and no African-American had served in the last thirty years); BOND, supra note
98, at 241 (finding deep racism in Georgia and describing historical news accounts
that predicted Whites would rather avoid jury cases that would be decided by mixed
jury); Schmidt, supra note 93, at 1406 (according to Booker T. Washington, “[i]n the
whole of Georgia & Alabama, and other Southern states not a negro juror is allowed
to sit in the jury box in state courts” (quoting 3 THE BOOKER T. WASHINGTON PAPERS 29
(L.R. Harlan ed., 1974)).
116
See LESLIE A. SCHWALM, EMANCIPATIONS DIASPORA: RACE AND RECONSTRUCTION IN
THE UPPER MIDWEST 29 (2009) (finding that Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin also
denied suffrage in the 1850s and 1860s).
117
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 54, at 894 (“A 1910 study found that AfricanAmericans rarely served on juries in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South
Carolina, and Virginia — and that they never served in Alabama and Georgia.” (citing
GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 253-72 (1969))).
118
See Forman, supra note 95, at 898.
119
See id. (“[T]he jury was of central concern both before and after the Civil War.”).
120
This battle began earlier than the formal civil rights movement. See LESTER C.
LAMON, BLACK TENNESSEANS: 1900–1930, at 9 (1977) (describing how as early as 1905
in Tennessee, Robert L. Mayfield challenged exclusion of African-Americans from jury
service, and again in 1907 John Early attempted to establish a test case to protest the
discrimination). This was also true in the Midwest. SCHWALM, supra note 116, at 178
(detailing how advocates wished to obtain jury service as a part of the right to
franchise).
121
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2076 (2002)
(discussing the NAACP’s successful challenge to racial exclusion in juries in Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)).
122
Hollins v. State of Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395 (1935).
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to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.”123 As can be
seen, in the battle for racial equality, jury service was framed as an
issue of constitutional identity. To be an equal constitutional citizen
meant being a participating juror, voter, and political agent.
C. The Nineteenth Amendment and Beyond
In an even more direct way, advocates for women’s suffrage linked
jury service to constitutional citizenship.124 During the efforts to
amend the Constitution to what would become the Nineteenth
Amendment, a clear call to constitutional identity was heard.125 As
Professor Vikram Amar has written, “There is much support for the
proposition that the struggle for women’s suffrage was, from the
outset, ‘also about the right to serve on juries.’”126 This constitutional
connection was emphasized as female Abolitionists recognized that the
battle for racial equality would not necessarily result in gender
equality. As Barbara Babcock has summarized:
The woman suffrage movement was born in the dawn of the
realization that unless they were forced into it, neither
politicians nor statesmen would ever go beyond the
enfranchisement of black men. It took fifty-two years, roughly
fifty national campaigns, and almost 1,000 state campaigns, as
well as the whole adult life of many earnest women, to win the
vote. From the beginning, their struggle was also about the
right to serve on juries. The two causes were the twin indicia

123
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012); see Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium:
Women’s Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139, 1147-48 (1993).
124
See Gretchen Ritter, Jury Service and Women’s Citizenship Before and After the
Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 479, 481 (2002) (“In the United States,
jury service is historically tied to voting. In most states, a common qualification for
jury service was the status of elector — that is, a citizen with the right to vote. This
also fit with the nineteenth-century woman rights movement’s conception of
citizenship. As equal voting citizens, women would obtain all of the rights and
privileges of other first class citizens, including the right to serve on a jury.”).
125
See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 90, at 86 (“The legislative history of the
Nineteenth Amendment reveals important things about its original public meaning in
1920: supporters of the Nineteenth Amendment believed and said that it would make
women equal to men under the law. . . . The opponents’ objection to giving women
the right to vote was that they were unfit for work outside of the home and that they
were unable to serve in the military or on juries because of the damage this would
cause to family life. This objection was soundly rejected.”).
126
Amar, Jury Service, supra note 74, at 241 (citing Babcock, supra note 123, at
1165).
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of full citizenship both in the minds of woman suffragists and
in the attitudes of American society.127
Just as had happened at the time of the founding, those interested in
redefining constitutional identity used jury service as a symbol of
constitutional equality.128 Jury service and voting were purposefully
linked in the minds and strategies of the advocates.129 Participation in
jury service was understood to convey a dignity interest that
symbolized civic equality.130 And it was this civic equality that was
expected to translate into a public identity of equality.131 Only by
embracing the hard work and responsibilities of citizenship were
women able to claim full equality.132
127
Babcock, supra note 123, at 1164; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 619 (2005) [hereinafter AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION] (citing
a 1919 New York Times article quoting Susan B. Anthony as stating, in protest of her
conviction for an unlawful vote attempt, “Had your honor submitted my case to the
jury, as was clearly your duty, even then I should have had just cause of protest, for
not one of those men was my peer . . . a commoner of England, tried before a jury of
lords, would have far less cause to complain than should I, a woman tried before a
jury of men.” Suffrage Wins in Senate: Now Goes to the States, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1919).
128
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 90, at 76 (“On their face, the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments only forbid disenfranchisement, but originally they were
understood to have implications beyond that. . . . [T]hey were understood to
guarantee full political rights, not simply the right to vote in elections.”).
129
See Ritter, supra note 124, at 498 (“For woman rights advocates, jury service
and suffrage were not just civic activities but also markers of civic status. The role of
voter and juror served not only to distinguish between citizens and noncitizens, but
also between those citizens who had political rights and those without them.”).
130
See Jennifer K. Brown, Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women’s Equality,
102 YALE L.J. 2175, 2183 (1993) (“The institution of the jury expresses a mutual faith
among citizens who assign to each other a function otherwise reserved to professional
judges and lawmakers: the power to determine wrongs, to remedy them, and to decide
each others’ fates. The expression ‘a jury of one’s peers’ imbues jury service with a
dignitary value.”).
131
Women “sought jury service as one facet of a greater struggle for recognition in
the public life of the community.” Babcock, supra note 123, at 1172; Ritter, supra note
124, at 481 (“Jury service was democracy in action — it was direct governance by the
citizens. Women’s exclusion from this role suggested that, even with the vote, they
had yet to obtain the status of equal citizens.”); id. at 483 (“Citizenship, particularly in
connection to the performance of substantial civic duties such as jury service, is
regarded as a public identity.”).
132
See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REV. 257, 266-67 (1986);
Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women’s Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of
Difference, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1141 (1994) (“The connection between jury service
and citizenship has long been emphasized by women’s rights advocates. An important
element of equality, commentators argue, is the right ‘to share the basic obligations of
public citizenship.’”); Ritter, supra note 124, at 506 (“Following the passage of the
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Despite these arguments, the social movements seeking equal access
to civic responsibilities had limited success.133 Courts immediately
curtailed women’s right to serve on juries.134 While the Nineteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1920, and fourteen states granted the right
to women to serve on juries, the constitutional changes did not open
the courthouse doors in other states.135 Courts distinguished the
automatic right to vote from the privilege of sitting on a jury.136
Voluntary systems of participation, opt-in systems, and a general
gendered prejudice made enacting the promise of universal jury
service a disappointing reality for much of the twentieth century.137
Yet, activists still fought for jury equality, almost as “a second
suffrage campaign.”138 The National League of Women Voters drafted

Nineteenth Amendment, woman rights activists of the 1920s focused on women’s
performance of citizenship. It was argued that women must not just enjoy the
privileges of citizenship, but should also share in its duties.”).
133
This was so even in jurisdictions where access to jury service had preceded
suffrage: Utah (1898), Washington (1911), Kansas (1912), Nevada (1914), California
(1917), and Michigan (1918). See infra notes 135-138.
134
Eskridge, supra note 121, at 2125-26 (“Women generally did not serve on juries
before World War I. Once women gained the right to vote, some state courts
construed their state jury service laws to include women because the laws tied jury
venires to voting lists. Nonetheless, as the nation entered World War II, only thirteen
states required the same jury service of women that they required of men; fifteen
states allowed women to opt out of compulsory jury service; twenty states disqualified
women as a class.”).
135
Ritter, supra note 124, at 503 (2002) (“Around the time that the Nineteenth
Amendment was passed, fourteen states granted women the right to serve on juries. In
half of these states, women were found to be automatically eligible for jury service
once they became electors. In the other seven, new laws were passed that made
women eligible to serve on juries. Yet despite vigorous campaigns by the League of
Women Voters, the National Women’s Party, and many other groups, during the rest
of the decade, only one new state and the District of Columbia were added to the list
of jurisdictions where women served on juries.”).
136
Grossman, supra note 132, at 1136-37 (“[C]ourts of several states held that
neither the Nineteenth Amendment, nor parallel state constitutional provisions
guaranteeing women’s suffrage, entitled women to serve on juries. These holdings
generally relied on a critical distinction: courts treated voting as an explicit right of
citizenship, but they considered jury service either a privilege or a duty.”).
137
See Eskridge, supra note 121, at 2125-26 (“By 1961, only three states retained
complete exclusions. Of the forty-seven states where women were eligible, twenty-one
states had no special gender-based rules, eight states allowed women to be excused if
their service would create hardships for their families, fifteen states and the District of
Columbia allowed women to opt out for any reason, and three states permitted
women to serve only if they opted in.”).
138
LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 137 (1998).
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a “Women’s Bill of Rights” which listed jury service as a top priority.139
They also provided advice for local activists to allow women on
juries.140 Other women’s organizations tracked progress on the various
state jury laws.141 As activist and future federal judge Burnita Shelton
Matthews commented, “If there is one subject which all the woman’s
organizations are agreed upon, it is, probably, jury service for
women.”142 Before and after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment,
women’s rights leaders specifically challenged jury service laws,
seeking to reform access to jury duty as part of the larger struggle for
constitutional equality.143
In a similar pattern to racial discrimination, it was individual court
cases, in the context of larger social movements that had the ultimate
effect of changing the law.144 Again, the arguments of constitutional
identity were central to these challenges. As but one example, William
Eskridge describes the litigation strategy challenging Florida’s jury
service practices which resulted in the Supreme Court case Hoyt v.
Florida:
Dorothy Kenyon persuaded the ACLU to befriend Hoyt on the
appeal, the [ACLU’s] first major feminist Supreme Court
139

Id. at 138 (“The League believed that the absence of women from juries was
part of the larger problem of the way in which sex bias intruded on the equal
administration of justice; they kept mandatory jury service statutes high on their
agenda.”).
140
KERBER, supra note 138, at 140 (describing the work done promoting state
changes in Florida and other states); Grossman, supra note 132, at 1139-40 (“The
National League of Women Voters, for example, provided practical suggestions for
local actors to wage the fight for women’s jury service.”).
141
KERBER, supra note 138, at 141 (describing the work done by the New York
State League of Women’s Voters, Women’s City Club, and National Woman’s Party);
Grossman, supra note 132, at 1140 (“Women’s groups also disseminated voluminous
information on the status of jury rights in each state, tracked progress and setbacks,
and encouraged women to fight for their rights on the local level.”).
142
Ritter, supra note 124, at 503.
143
Grossman, supra note 132, at 1139 (“Women’s rights advocates engaged in a
nationwide struggle to change jury service laws; they provided instruction,
information, and political advice to many women, and submitted lists of uniform
requests and proposed jury bills to state legislatures. This campaign constituted part of
a larger effort to promote women’s equality in all areas, including property,
inheritance, guardianship, wage compensation, entry to professions, and election to
public office.”).
144
HOLLY J. MCCAMMON, THE U.S. WOMEN’S JURY MOVEMENT AND STRATEGIC
ADAPTION: A MORE JUST VERDICT 108-09 (2012) (describing state campaigns in
Massachusetts and other states); Abrahamson, supra note 132, at 269 (“Campaigners
for jury service for women were adamant in their belief that men and women should
serve as jurors on equal terms.”).
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filing. Her remarkable amicus brief argued that representation
on juries is an important civil right, as illustrated by the
experience of blacks, who did not achieve genuine citizenship
until the Court required that they be invited to its burdens
such as jury service.145
These arguments and others demonstrated that equal constitutional
status required equal opportunity to serve on a jury.146 This message
was finally adopted by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana,147
which prohibited gender discrimination in establishing the jury
venire, and J.E.B. v. Louisiana,148 which prohibited gender
discrimination in jury selection.
D. A Constitutional Identity
While admittedly a sweeping analysis of several centuries of jury
development, three themes appear in these foundational conceptions
of the juror as constitutional citizen. First, the role of the juror in
society was important — both to the legal system and to the political
system. This elevated role stemmed directly from its connection to the
Constitution. At the founding, jurors considered themselves
constitutional actors within a constitutional system, and undertook
the responsibilities that the role required. After the founding, during
the battles for political and social equality, this elevated role served as
a symbol of equal constitutional status. These battles for equality were
fought to create a more diverse fact-finding body, but also because
jury service involved a respected constitutional identity. The potential
right to serve as a juror was as important as the actual service.
Second, this constitutional role was an ongoing role. The
responsibility to serve as a juror was not satisfied by a single
summons, but involved embracing the continuing status of being a
citizen. This identity drew its power not simply for what a juror could
decide in the courthouse, but what it meant to be invited as an equal
participant in the constitutional structure.
145

Eskridge, supra note 121, at 2127.
See supra notes 127-137 and accompanying text.
147
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1975); see Ritter, supra note 124, at
483 (“Jury service may be regarded as either a political right, that is, as a form of
democratic participation in the exercise of law and justice, or as a civil right — as a
matter of individual protection against state authority. Woman rights activists of the
nineteenth century understood this dual character of jury service, and thought of
political and civil rights as intimately connected, with political rights providing a
mandate for broader claims of civil rights.”).
148
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
146
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Third, this important, ongoing, constitutional role required some
work on the part of jurors before, during, and after jury service. The
jury was an active body, which required equally active and educated
jurors. This education involved an awareness of the constitutional role
of the jury, as well as the responsibilities of citizens in a system of selfgovernment.
The modern Supreme Court has acknowledged the juror’s
connection to constitutional identity and at least rhetorically
reaffirmed its importance. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Powers v. Ohio presents the clearest example of this linkage.149 Justice
Kennedy begins the opinion by stating that “[j]ury service is an
exercise of responsible citizenship by all members of the community,
including those who otherwise might not have the opportunity to
contribute to our civic life.”150 Citing to Strauder and then the series of
first generation cases that followed, the Court sets out the longstanding connection between the jury and constitutional citizenship.151
Quoting Alexis de Tocqueville about the jury’s educative value and
highlighting the jury’s recognized importance in the constitutional
structure, Justice Kennedy asserts:
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it
guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued
acceptance of the laws by all of the people. It “affords ordinary
citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a process of
government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for
law.” Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens
the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant
opportunity to participate in the democratic process.152
In reversing Larry Joe Powers’s conviction because racial
discrimination infected the jury selection process, Justice Kennedy
located the source of the violated right with the potential jurors struck

149

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
Id. at 402.
151
Id. (citing Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1880)). See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 470 (1953) (“Discriminations
against a race by barring or limiting citizens of that race from participation in jury
service are odious to our thought and our Constitution. This has long been accepted
as the law.”); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“For racial discrimination to
result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only
violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.”).
152
Powers, 499 U.S. at 407.
150
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from the jury panel.153 It was the potential juror struck from the jury
venire (not the defendant) whose constitutional right had been
violated by racial discrimination.154 Finding third party standing, the
Supreme Court located the harm as the reputational harm of
excluding the potential juror based on racial discrimination.155 Such
exclusion undermined the potential juror’s connection to the legal
system and claim to constitutional equality.156 It also risked
undermining the legitimacy of the larger legal system.157
In so linking potential jury service and constitutional identity,
Powers reaffirms several central rhetorical and substantive claims that
the Supreme Court has stood by in its jury decisions. First, the
potential right to serve on a jury is a constitutional right.158 Second,
that this right is not merely the private right held by the defendant or
juror, but connects to the public right for a jury free from
153
Mr. Powers was white and the excluded jurors non-white, and thus the claim
was not made that the constitutional injury was to Mr. Powers. Instead the Court
stated, “Active discrimination by a prosecutor during this process condones violations
of the United States Constitution within the very institution entrusted with its
enforcement, and so invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation
to adhere to the law.” Id. at 412.
154
Id. at 413-15 (“A venire person excluded from jury service because of race
suffers a profound personal humiliation heightened by its public character. The
rejected juror may lose confidence in the court and its verdicts, as may the defendant
if his or her objections cannot be heard. This congruence of interests makes it
necessary and appropriate for the defendant to raise the rights of the juror. . . . We
conclude that a defendant in a criminal case can raise the third-party equal protection
claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution because of their race.”).
155
Id. at 412 (“A prosecutor’s wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based
peremptory challenge is a constitutional violation committed in open court at the
outset of the proceedings. The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel,
casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere
to the law throughout the trial of the cause. The voir dire phase of the trial represents
the ‘jurors’ first introduction to the substantive factual and legal issues in a case.’”
(citation omitted)).
156
Id.
157
See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (“Undoubtedly, the
overriding interest in eradicating discrimination from our civic institutions suffers
whenever an individual is excluded from making a significant contribution to
governance on account of his race. Yet the ‘harm from discriminatory jury selection
extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the
entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.’” (quoting
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986))).
158
As some justices have criticized, this placement of the right with the potential
juror “exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal
defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or
even death.” Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 62 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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discriminatory exclusion. Third, that the participatory aspect of jury
service (even the potential for jury service) is an important component
to our national identity.159 These insights directly emerge from the
conception of constitutional identity seen in the suffrage and civil
rights movements, and inform discussion of “the potentiality of jury
service” discussed in Part III.
It is also an image bolstered by the Supreme Court’s opinions
discussing the historic role of jurors outside the equal protection
context. In cases involving the importance of jurors deciding the facts
to determine a sentence, the court has shown great respect to the
historical link between the jury and the Constitution.160 As Justice
Scalia wrote in Blakely v. Washington, “[The right to a jury trial] is no
mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in
our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people’s
ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”161 It is a structural
vision that posits the jury as outside the judicial branch, but necessary
to the larger constitutional structure.
While undoubtedly the Court has provided some powerful rhetoric
in support of this jury role, much appears to be aspirational rather than
a reflection of the current reality.162 As an ideal, juries remain central to
159
Powers, 499 U.S. at 406 (“‘The jury system postulates a conscious duty of
participation in the machinery of justice. . . . One of its greatest benefits is in the
security it gives the people that they, as jurors actual or possible, being part of the
judicial system of the country can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse.’” (quoting Balzac
v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922))).
160
Vikram David Amar, Implementing an Historical Vision of the Jury in an Age of
Administrative Factfinding and Sentencing Guidelines, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 291, 293 (2005)
(“The basic constitutional vision underlying the Booker/Blakely/Apprendi line of cases
focuses on the centrality of the institution of the jury in our system of government of
the people, by the people, and for the people.”).
161
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004); see also Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I feel the need to say a few
words in response to Justice Breyer’s dissent. It sketches an admirably fair and efficient
scheme of criminal justice designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal
justice to the State. (Judges, it is sometimes necessary to remind ourselves, are part of
the State — and an increasingly bureaucratic part of it, at that.) The founders of the
American Republic were not prepared to leave it to the State, which is why the jurytrial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has
never been efficient; but it has always been free.”).
162
Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the
Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1477 (1994) (“The text of the Bill of
Rights serves both a commemorative function, as it reminds us of the founding
aspirations from which our polity is derived, and a challenging function, as it exhorts
us to respond to those aspirations in the present and as we construct the future.
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the legal system. As a practical reality, jury trials are the exception not
the rule. This limitation in the use of juries has had negative effects on
juror identity and has created a less powerful institution with less
involved citizens. This is the subject of the next Part.
II.

A TASK-ORIENTED JURY

Today, in courts all over America there is a remarkable consensus
on the role of the jury.163 The jury finds facts.164 It is a utilitarian,
practical identity. As the Supreme Court has stated in the criminal
context, “The jury’s function is to find the facts and to decide whether,
on those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.”165 In
practice, this means that jurors listen to witnesses, evidence, and
argument and make judgments based on the submitted information.166
Then the jurors apply the law as provided by the judge to those facts
and the standards of proof provided.167 As described, it is a stand-alone
responsibility that takes place at the courthouse and only on
infrequent occasion. And while of course, the reality of finding facts is
inexorably tied up with legal, moral, and personal judgments, in
theory, the role of the jury remains narrowly framed.168
Unquestionably, this role as fact-finder is important, central, and
based on a long history of the fact-finding abilities of citizens.169 This
Viewed thusly, the Constitution expresses a political-moral ideal, using aspirational
rhetoric to articulate societal goals and values.”).
163
See supra note 3.
164
Kemmitt, supra note 2, at 112 (“The party line typically hewn to by modern
American courts is that the jury exists merely to find facts: juries make factual
determinations and judges sentence, end of story.”); Young, supra note 3, at 147
(noting that Georgia, Maryland, and Indiana have state law protections for jurors to
decide the law, but they are in large measure ignored).
165
Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).
166
See infra Part II.B. (discussing the role of the juror instruction). Each of the fifty
states, the federal courts, and the District of Columbia has now established standard
jury instructions that detail these responsibilities. Daniel William Bell, Juror
Misconduct and the Internet, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 84 (2010) (“State and federal laws
are widely available online, and all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
posted ‘standard’ jury instructions on publicly-accessible websites.”).
167
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) (“[T]he jury’s constitutional
responsibility is not merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts
and draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence.”).
168
Marder, Myth of the Nullifying Jury, supra note 34, at 909-15.
169
From soon after the first ships landed near Plymouth in 1620 to the present
day, jurors have resolved contested versions of events. Barkow, supra note 30, at 51
n.73 (“The only existing recorded law from the first five years of the Plymouth
Colony, for example, is a list of criminal offenses and a provision for jury trials in all
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Article seeks no quarrel with the successful mechanism for decisionmaking that is the modern jury.170 Instead, this Article seeks to
understand how a consensus emerged that this is the only role for
jurors. Juries have become a task-oriented enterprise, limited in time
and scope. This Article examines whether in emphasizing a modern,
task-oriented process, jurors have lost a sense of constitutional
identity.
This section focuses on three major changes that have affected the
jury. First, it looks at the legal responsibility given to and taken from
jurors over the last two hundred years. Through a series of court
decisions in the latter part of the nineteenth century, juries were
stripped of their law finding power, thus reducing their
responsibilities. Second, it looks at the use of formalized jury
instructions to standardize the role of the jury across the country.
These instructions have had a dramatic impact on constitutional
identity, because of what they affirmatively instruct jurors about their
role. The final section examines the impact of jury duty reforms on
shaping the identity of the jury. In the past several decades, new
federal and state programs to make jury service more user-friendly and
less time-consuming have swept the nation. Developments like “one
day and one trial” systems have been remarkably effective in lessening
the burden on citizens.171 However, at the same time, these
improvements have reinforced the message that jury service is a
limited, discrete, task-oriented job. As will be discussed, these natural
and perhaps understandable changes to the jury, have had a negative
impact on preserving a robust sense of constitutional identity.
A. From Law-Finders to Fact-Finders
As originally conceived, jurors in America did more than merely
find facts.172 As a matter of practice, juries were empowered to
interpret, if not decide, the law.173 Because of the limited state of legal
criminal cases.”).
170
J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 230-31 (1988) (“We also have good reason to
believe that juries are, on the whole, remarkably adept as triers of fact. Virtually every
study of them, regardless of the research method, has reached that conclusion . . . .
The capabilities of jurors — perhaps not as individuals but as a group — even appear
to extend to cases of the greatest complexity.”).
171
See infra Part II.C.
172
Barkow, supra note 30, at 55 (“The Framers continued to believe that the
criminal jury was much more than ‘a utilitarian fact-finding body.’”).
173
Howe, supra note 35, at 592-96; see Carroll, supra note 8, at 670 (“This vision of
jurors and their role as political actors is present in the Founders’ discussion of the
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training and the immaturity of the legal system, jurors were
encouraged to evaluate the merits of criminal law, and determine
much of civil law.174 As a result, lawyers routinely argued law to juries,
and expected juries to understand these arguments.175 Leading
Founding Fathers such as Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, Thomas
Jefferson, John Jay, and Chief Justice John Marshall all expressed
support for the law-finding nature of the jury.176 While scholars have
counseled some caution in not overstating the law-finding power of
the Framing Era jury, recognition of a broader jury role was part of the
original design.177
This outsized jury role arose not simply out of necessity, but
constitutional intent. The jury existed as a check against government
Constitution and the role of the law in post-Revolutionary America. They conceived of
the jury as the space where the law met the governed and, in so doing, became
whole.”).
174
R.J. Farley, Instructions to Juries: Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J.
194, 202 (1932) (“In America by the time of the Revolution and for some time
thereafter, the power to decide the law in criminal cases seems to have been almost
universally accorded the jury and quite generally, it determined the law in civil
cases.”).
175
McClanahan, True Right, supra note 30, at 799 (“Among the greater powers
given to colonial juries, the courts allowed lawyers to argue the validity of laws to
juries.”).
176
Middlebrooks, supra note 30, at 374-75; see also Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 1 (1794) (Jay, C.J.); McClanahan, True Right, supra note 30, at 816 (“In the
treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807, Chief Justice Marshall declared in his jury
instructions that ‘the jury have now heard the opinions of the court on the law of the
case. They will apply that law to the facts and will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty
as their own consciences may direct.’”).
177
Stanton D. Strauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Find the Law in
Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 121-22 (1998) (“My conclusion
is that the published records I have studied do not support the conventional wisdom.
In fact, this data only proves that the criminal jury’s right in any real sense to
determine the law was firmly established in one colony, offbeat Rhode Island. While
there is sporadic evidence that criminal juries may have had some form of lawfinding
authority at times in colonial Pennsylvania and New York, there is at least as strong an
indication that they had no such right for much of the colonial era in Georgia,
Maryland, and Massachusetts. For the most part, however, we just don’t know enough
to say what lawfinding authority colonial criminal juries had.”); see id. at 213
(“Although that evidence includes statements by judges, lawyers, jurors, litigants, and
others asserting that criminal juries had the right to determine what the law was, I
have found no evidence that anyone claimed that these juries had the right to ignore
what they deemed the applicable law.”); William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of
Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1029 (2010) (“On the issue of the
lawfinding power of colonial juries, the score is roughly tied with my research not yet
completed: juries possessed ultimate power over the law in New England and Virginia,
but not in the Carolinas, New York, and Pennsylvania.”).

1138

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:1105

power (both the prosecution and the courts).178 In addition, it
reflected the democratic, participatory ideals of the new constitutional
structure.179 As has been discussed, the jury represented a citizen-voice
in parallel to the other constitutional power sources in society.180 As
has been well detailed by others, this law-finding role involved
shaping verdicts to avoid certain punishments or even challenging the
appropriateness of prosecuting certain crimes.181
Over time, however, this law-finding role became a contested issue
in a maturing American legal system. Federal judges began restricting
this power, reasoning that in a democratic society unelected jurors had
no right to usurp the role of the legislature or the courts.182 Some
states followed suit,183 even as others continued to protect the historic

178
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (“[T]he Framers put a jurytrial guarantee in the Constitution [because] they were unwilling to trust government
to mark out the role of the jury.”); see id. at 313 (“Our Constitution and the commonlaw traditions it entrenches . . . do not admit the contention that facts are better
discovered by judicial inquisition than by adversarial testing before a jury.”).
179
Akhil Amar has said juries were the “embodiments of late-eighteenth-century
republican ideology.” AMAR, AMERICAN’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 127, at 234; see also
Jon P. McClanahan, Citizen Participation in Japanese Criminal Trials: Reimagining the
Right to Trial by Jury in the United States, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725, 736
(2012) (“The Founders believed that there were two primary benefits to allowing
citizen participation through jury service. First, the jury was seen as an educational
tool, teaching citizens about the government and their rights and responsibilities. . . .
Second, the Founders conceived of the jury as one part of the judicial branch, a type
of ‘lower judicial bench’ in a bicameral judiciary.”).
180
Barkow, supra note 30, at 34 (“From the outset, the criminal jury was designed
to be part of our elaborate system of checks and balances, placing a check on the
legislature and executive to ensure that no one received criminal punishment unless a
group of ordinary citizens agreed.”).
181
See id. at 48-65; Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 321-22.
182
Farley, supra note 174, at 202 (“There is small room for doubt that the jury
reached its zenith before 1835, when Justice Story, as circuit judge, instructing a jury,
made a point upon which he had had a decided opinion during his whole professional
life. He said that regardless of physical power and the necessity of compounding law
and fact, the jury had no moral right to decide the law according to their own notions.
On the contrary, he held it the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused
of crime that the jury should respond as to the facts and the court as to the law.”); see
also McClanahan, True Right, supra note 30, at 819-20 (“‘[I]t is the duty of the court to
instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is
laid down by the court.’” (quoting United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043
(C.C. Mass. 1835))).
183
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 54, at 910 (“Between 1850 and 1931, the courts
of at least eleven states (Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia) rejected
the view that juries should judge issues of law as well as fact.”).
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jury power.184 Adding to the turmoil, increasing economic pressures
from a developing industrial economy furthered a call to have more
predictable verdicts decided by established judges and not itinerant
juries.185 Jurors themselves were on occasion challenged as being
erratic, uneducated, or incompetent.186 In addition, the growing
professionalism of judges and lawyers seeking to control the legal
market added incentive to reduce reliance on non-professional citizenjurors to decide the law.187 Finally, some scholars have traced the
parallel between the diversification of the jury venire to include
women and people of color with the concomitant restriction of jury
power, hypothesizing that such a restriction was a direct reaction to a
more democratic jury pool.188
In 1895, the United States Supreme Court ended the debate and
settled the juror’s role in the American legal system.189 In Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, the Supreme Court held that it was not error
for a judge to instruct the jury that it must follow the court’s
instruction on the law. Justice Harlan wrote what stands as the
controlling understanding of the jury role: “[I]t is the duty of juries in
criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the

184
McClanahan, True Right, supra note 30, at 816 (“By 1851, at least nine states
had given juries the right to decide issues of law through constitutional provision or
statute, and at least six other states had recognized the jury’s right to decide issues of
law by judicial decision.”); see id. at 822 (“The Massachusetts legislature responded by
enacting a statute explicitly giving criminal juries the right to decide questions of law
and fact in criminal cases. . . . In Vermont, an 1849 supreme court decision affirmed
the jury’s right to decide the law in a manner contrary to that of the judge, rejecting
the reasoning in United States v. Battiste.”).
185
Landsman, supra note 59, at 607 (“The judiciary came to believe that the jury
was incapable of comprehending the new industrial reality. Judges also assumed that
jurors were irremediably biased against corporate defendants. Based on these
assumptions, judges sought to curtail the jury’s authority.”); Smith, supra note 30, at
445 (“However, over time, there was some feeling that juries tended to act irrationally
and could not function well when the issues to be tried were complex. Thus, it is not
altogether surprising that as legal principles (and society in general) grew increasingly
complex, the role of the jury in adjudicating disputes decreased. Furthermore, one
must not forget that two powerful interest groups had a vested interest in seeing
certain aspects of the jury’s power curtailed. Both judges and lawyers would fill the
vacuum left by the erosion in the jury’s power.”).
186
Smith, supra note 30, at 468-69.
187
“Lawyers and judges eager to gain professional prestige and alliances with
economically powerful commercial parties attempted to represent the law as an
objective, neutral, and apolitical system.” Middlebrooks, supra note 30, at 355.
188
Marder, Introduction to the Jury, supra note 43, at 922-23.
189
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
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facts as they find them to be from the evidence.”190 In short, judges
decide the law and juries decide the facts.191 This understanding
remains the law of the land.192 Jurors identify themselves as mere factfinders because the Supreme Court and other courts have told them to
think that way.
This reduction in role was but one of several contributing factors to
the change in constitutional identity.193 Juries went from being an
independent body with quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative powers,
structurally apart from the judge, to becoming a fact-finding
appendage of the court. Instead of deciding the entire case, jurors were
only asked to decide a portion of the case. Instead of seeing themselves
as a check on the judge and judicial system, they became a part of the
judicial system. This meant reduced constitutional authority, and
minimized any separate sense of constitutional identity.
B. Standardized Jury Instructions
The rise of standardized jury instructions also contributed to the
narrowing of the jury role. Beginning in the 1930s, courts began to
write down instructions on how jurors should consider evidence, how
to deliberate, and how to decide a case.194 The “role of the jury”
instruction became a part of a comprehensive list of instructions to be
read to all jurors.195 Studying how these instructions influenced the
task-oriented nature of the jury is the subject of this section.
Before looking at jury instructions in general and the “role of the
jury” instruction in particular, it is necessary to mention a few
contextual points that frame the larger discussion. First, as a matter of
practice in early courts, a lack of formal, written jury instructions
contributed to the broader law-finding role of the early jury.196
Through much of the Founding Era and beyond, jury instructions
190

Id. at 102-103.
Id.
192
Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1595 (2011).
193
Citizens still sought equal treatment through equal political rights even after the
1895 Sparf decision formally disempowered juries. Finding facts as a representative
member of a jury still carried significant constitutional import, and the literal and
symbolic connection to constitutional power did not change.
194
Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions, supra note 41, at 494 (“With the advent of
pattern jury instructions in the 1930s, the judge prepared written instructions based
on the pattern instructions and delivered them word for word to the jurors as they sat
and listened.”).
195
Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL
L. REV. 49, 52-53 (1997).
196
See Farley, supra note 174, at 204-205; Ferguson, supra note 9, at 286-88.
191
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were oral and usually the product of the individual judge or drafted by
the parties.197 In fact, because in early trials judges could comment on
the evidence, the instructions came with editorializing or specific
suggestions by the judge.198 Further, without a sophisticated system of
transmitting appellate decisions, “the law” remained less formalized
than it is now199 and jurors brought their own sense of the law to
court.200 Thus, the move to formalized jury instructions encouraged a
move to a more restricted role for jurors.201
As a general matter, standardized, “pattern” jury instructions are
now common in all federal and state courts.202 These instructions are
197
Farley, supra note 174, at 204-205 (“Under the common law, instructions were
oral and before the statutory change it was incumbent upon the person excepting to
get them reduced to writing, for recordation was discretionary with the trial judge.”).
198
Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting
the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 190 (2004)
(“The first indications of judicial instructions to jurors might better be termed judicial
recommendations. Much of the exchange could be described as judicial marshaling of
the evidence. Trial courts would sum up the testimony and frequently express
personal opinions regarding witnesses’ credibility.”); see also Smith, supra note 30, at
442-43 (noting that the practice of judges commenting on evidence was mostly over
by 1913, when forty-one states or territories had abandoned the practice through
constitutional provision, statute, or judicial decision).
199
Cf. Young, supra note 3, at 147 (“According to one treatise published in 1877,
many states required jury instructions be in writing in order to prevent uncertainty as
to their language and terms.” (citing JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 416
(1877))).
200
Ritter, supra note 198, at 188-89 (recognizing the “era from the seventeenth
century through much of the nineteenth century, when jurors took it upon themselves
or in some settings were even encouraged to determine questions of law as well as
questions of fact [during which] there was a commonly held belief that jurors already
knew the law as well as anyone else.”); Roger Roots, The Rise and Fall of the American
Jury, 8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 5-6 (2011) (“Common citizens of early America were
known to have been highly interested in and knowledgeable about legal issues. Nearly
2,500 copies of Blackstone’s Commentaries were sold in the colonies in the ten years
prior to the Revolution.”).
201
Finally, it should be recognized that Sparf was, itself, a jury instructions case.
The precise issue in Sparf was whether a judge had erred in instructing the jury that
their role was to apply the facts to the law as given by the judge. Thus, when states
began the process of writing down instructions, the “role of the jury” instruction
could be derived straight from a Supreme Court decision. See Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 59-61 (1895).
202
Ritter, supra note 198, at 192 (“[F]or quite a number of years now American
trial courts have been delivering relatively uniform jury instructions.”);
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL
JURORS SERVING IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 3, available at
http://www.nynd.uscourts.gov/pdf/trialhandbook.pdf (“The judge in a criminal case
tells the jury what the law is. The jury must determine what the true facts are. On that
basis the jury has only to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty as to
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usually the product of court-led committees. As Professor Nancy
Marder has written,
Pattern jury instructions are created in different ways. They
can be written by a committee of lawyers and judges, as is the
practice in Illinois, by a committee of judges, as was the
practice in California, or by a judge, who collects his own and
other judges’ instructions, refines them, and ultimately makes
them available to all judges by publishing them.203
Notably, in each of the possibilities judges play a central role, with
trial judges making the first drafts, other trial judges rewriting them,
and appellate judges essentially editing the language of these
instructions through their published opinions.
The resulting jury instructions determine the official word of how
jurors understand their role.204 In most cases, jury instructions are the
only guide provided to inform jurors of their jobs. Thus, it is
important to study the various jury instructions to see how modern
jurors understand their role inside and outside of court. As will be
discussed, there is a remarkable consistency across jurisdictions, with
jurors relegated to a very specific role.205
First, most jury instructions tell jurors to find the facts. The jury’s
“duty” is to determine the facts.206 It is the jury’s “exclusive province”
each offense charged. What happens thereafter is not for the jury’s consideration, but
is the sole responsibility of the judge.”).
203
Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions, supra note 41, at 458-59.
204
Id. at 451 (recognizing that jury instructions “are the sole vehicle by which
judges instruct jurors on the law and on their tasks before the jury begins its
deliberations”).
205
In fact, one federal handbook for jurors so clearly divides the fact-finding role
of the jury in contrast to the law-giving role of the judge that a commentator
analogized it to the Taylorism model of building Model-T cars, with jurors as the
factory workers. See Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s
Uneasy Relationship with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 966-67 (2010) (“This division
of labor between the modern jury and judge is so complementary that the federal juror
handbook tells jurors that they and the judge are a team. Conjuring images of Henry
Ford’s assembly line, with each worker doing his part to build a great American car,
the handbook tells jurors that ‘through . . . teamwork . . . judge and jury . . . working
together in a common effort, put into practice the principles of our great heritage of
freedom.’”).
206
See, e.g., STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, ARIZONA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS —
CRIMINAL 1 (3d ed. 2010) (“It is your duty to determine what the facts are in the case
by determining what actually happened. Determine the facts only from the evidence
produced in court.”); ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CIVIL 103 (2013) (“(b) It is my duty as judge to inform
you of the law applicable to this case by instructions, and it is your duty to accept and
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to “determine what the real facts were.”207 In almost every jurisdiction,
the division between jury and judge is clear. As the New York State
criminal jury instruction reads: “We are both judges in a very real
sense. I am the judge of the law and you, Ladies and Gentlemen, are
the judges of the facts.”208 Jury instructions, thus, provide a clear
demarcation of role.209 Judges provide the law that juries must accept

follow them as a whole, not singling out one instruction to the exclusion of others.
You should not consider any rule of law with which you may be familiar unless it is
included in my instructions. (c) It is your duty to determine the facts from the
evidence produced in this trial. You are to apply the law as contained in these
instructions to the facts and render your verdict upon the evidence and law.”); 2
GEORGIA SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES 0.01.00 (4th ed.
2013) (“The jury has a very important role. It is your duty to determine the facts of
the case and to apply the law to those facts. I will instruct you on the laws that apply
to this case, but you must determine the facts from the evidence.”).
207
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.1 (4th ed. 2013)
(“In the performance of our duties, yours and mine, you as the jury and I as the court
have separate functions. To put it briefly, it is my duty to state to you the rules of law
involved in the decision of this case and it is your duty to find the facts. You alone are
responsible for determining the facts. It is your exclusive province to deal with the
evidence and determine what the real facts were, and to reach the final conclusion as
to the guilt or innocence of the accused. By applying the law, as I give it to you, to the
facts as you find them to be, you will arrive at your verdict. You must perform that
duty with strict regard to the law as given to you by the court, because the court alone
is responsible for stating the law and the legal principles involved.”).
208
1 CHARGES TO JURY AND REQUESTS TO CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK
§ 3:2 (2013).
209
See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT, CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 1.5 (2013) (“My responsibility as the judge is to give you all the law that you need
to know in order to solve or resolve the issues placed before you on this jury. You
must take the law as I give it to you. You have no option whatsoever in that regard.
You as jurors are the sole factfinders in this case. Many of you have had life
experiences that may have touched on similar type matters as have appeared in this
case. Perhaps some of you over the years have read novels concerning this type of
thing and this type of case, or have seen television programs, or a variety of other
sources. Sometimes jurors, by exposing themselves to a variety of things during the
course of their lives, develop ideas about what they would like the law to be or
develop ideas in their own mind about what the law is. You do not have that option.
You must take the law as I give it to you and apply that law, and that law alone, to the
facts as you and you alone collectively find those facts to be.”); PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURT, CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.05 (2005) (“It is my responsibility to decide all
questions of law. Therefore, you must accept and follow my rulings and instructions
on matters of law. I am not, however, the judge of the facts. It is not for me to decide
what are the true facts concerning the charges against the defendant. You, the jurors,
are the sole judges of the facts. It will be your responsibility to consider the evidence,
to find the facts, and, applying the law to the facts as you find them, to decide whether
the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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without question.210 Juries are merely required to apply the
instructions to the facts.211 With only minimal variation,212 these
instructions frame the understanding of the juror role.
The unsurprising result of these almost uniform instructions is that
jurors see themselves as fact-finders and nothing more. Jurors swear
an oath to follow those instructions, and the courts presume they
follow that oath.213 Since jury instructions are silent about any broader
constitutional duty, jurors are left without any other conception of a
different role.214 As such, jurors adopt a more limited vision of the jury
— a vision that focuses on what the juror is expected to do in the
courthouse, not who a juror is expected to be in a constitutional
democracy.
C. Jury Streamlining Efforts
In the last several decades, jury reform movements have made
marked improvements in the process of jury service.215 These reforms
210
SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO, COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 3:01
(1993) (“It is my job to decide what rules of law apply to the case. . . . You must
follow all of the rules as I explain them to you. Even if you disagree or don’t
understand the reasons for some of the rules, you must follow them. No single rule
describes all the law which must be applied. Therefore, the rules must be considered
together as a whole. During the course of the trial you received all of the evidence that
you may properly consider to decide the case. Your decision must be made by
applying the rules of law which I give you to the evidence presented at trial.”).
211
See TENNESSEE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMMITTEE
(CRIMINAL), CRIMINAL 1.08 (2013) (“You are the exclusive judges of the facts in this
case. Also, you are the exclusive judges of the law under the direction of the court.
You should apply the law to the facts in deciding this case. You should consider all of
the evidence in the light of your own observations and experience in life.”); UTAH
SUPREME COURT, UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CR202 (2013) (“You have two main duties
as jurors. The first is to decide from the evidence what the facts are. Deciding what the
facts are is your job, not mine. The second duty is to take the law I give you in the
instructions, apply it to the facts, and decide if the prosecution has proved the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
212
See CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE, INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CRIMINAL INSTRUCTION 13.03 (3d ed. 2007) (“Under the Constitution of Indiana you
have the right to determine both the law and the facts. The Court’s instructions are
your best source in determining the law.”).
213
See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, THE
JUROR’S SOLEMN OATH, available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/jury_handbook.
php?id=7 (“Members of the Jury, you will rise, hold up your right hands, and be
sworn to try this case.”).
214
See Ferguson, supra note 9, at 240.
215
Munsterman, supra note 42, at 216 (“Beginning in the 1960s the pace of jury
system change accelerated. Fueling efforts were the development of court
Management, challenges to the representativeness and the randomness of the jury
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were necessitated by citizen complaints that jury service took too long
and court systems were too inefficient.216 By most measures these
reform projects have been quite successful. Juror waiting time has
been cut down.217 Jurors are summoned less often.218 And, in
combination with better outreach and a wider jury pool, the burden of
jury duty has been spread to more citizens who previously had been
exempted or excluded.219
Yet, the benefits of efficiency have had consequences on juror selfperception. One consequence involves the largely unintended effect
that jury service marketing campaigns have focused on the limited
nature of jury service. In promoting the fact that jury duty is less of a
burden, court administrators have also promoted the fact that jurors
only have a short-term, discrete responsibility to the court.220 As will
be discussed, jury streamlining projects like “one day, one trial” by
their nature reinforce the task-oriented sense of jury service. Again,
the point is not to criticize these efforts (making jury duty more
pleasant is a good thing), but examine the consequences to juror
identity from the change.
selection process, the desire to make jury systems mindful of the citizen’s time and the
cost to communities, and the availability of automation.”); see also Young, supra note
3, at 148.
216
See THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, TENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF
ALABAMA, BIRMINGHAM DIVISION, JUROR HANDBOOK, available at http://10jc.alacourt.gov/
forms/Handbook_April_2007.pdf (“We know that jury duty is inconvenient for most
of you but it is one of the most important obligations of citizenship. We will do our
best to make efficient use of your time here.”); Hillel Y. Levin & John W. Emerson, Is
There a Bias Against Education in the Jury Selection Process?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 325,
330-31 (2006) (noting that in an effort to combat educated jurors from being excused,
“A few [scholars] have suggested that jury duty be made more attractive by shortening
terms of service or raising pay.”).
217
Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty First
Century, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1257, 1272 n.66 (2001) (recognizing that systems such as
one-day, one-trial “show[] respect for a juror’s time and has gone a long way toward
convincing prospective jurors to respond to their summons”).
218
See generally Munsterman, supra note 42, at 218 (discussing the one-day, onetrial system).
219
See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 23, at 792 (“[W]ith the increased
representativeness of the jury pool and the growing prevalence of one-day/one-trial
systems of jury service, America has gone a great distance toward full
representativeness of the venire in the past few decades.”).
220
For example, courts advertise the task-oriented nature of jury service. In Ohio,
the Hamilton County courthouse’s website reads, “Welcome to jury service. The
performance of jury service is the fulfillment of a civil and moral obligation.
Conscientious service brings its own reward in the satisfaction of an important task
well done.” HAMILTON COUNTY JURY COMMISSIONER OFFICE, http://www.hamiltonco.org/common_pleas/jury_commissioner.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).

1146

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:1105

The need for jury reform started well before the recent reforms.
People have avoided jury duty since the advent of jury duty.221 This
has resulted in poor attendance222 and a perception that certain classes
of people could avoid service.223 For our purposes, the story of jury
reform starts in the 1990s,224 with a series of studies that called for
major jury improvements.225 The American Bar Association (“ABA”)
and state jury commissions undertook comprehensive evaluations of
how to improve the quality of the jury process.226 In fact, in the ten
221
See Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796–1996,
94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2678 (1996) [hereinafter Juror Delinquency] (“Early in the
nineteenth century, jury avoidance was a continual nuisance for courts.”); id. at 2683
(“Fining those who failed to obey summonses appeared to be a universal response to
jury dodging throughout the colonial period, and in the early 1800s statutes in most
states authorized fines ranging from one dollar to $250.”). However, a caveat to this
reality is that wealthy jurors could on occasion buy their way out of jury service. Id. at
2684.
222
See Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions, The
Impairment of the “Fair Cross-Section of the Community,” 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 158
(1998) (“Although jury duty is an obligation of citizenship, many people do not
consider it as such, and millions have not fulfilled this duty when called to serve.”).
223
King, Juror Delinquency, supra note 221, at 2688 (“There is some basis for this
perception that the middle and upper classes were fleeing from jury service during the
decades between 1870 and 1940. Because the administration of jury summonses
remained a one-man operation in most jurisdictions, it was not difficult to use money
or other influence to gain an exemption from jury service, and some of the well-to-do
took advantage of the opportunity to avoid being summoned. Many others simply
ignored their summonses or relied on the liberal granting of excuses, sometimes
making illegal payments or lying for the privilege.”).
224
See id. at 2685-86 (“In the decades between the Civil War and World War II,
inconvenience and financial loss still topped the list of reasons for avoiding jury
service, and courts and legislatures took their first steps to ease these burdens.”).
225
See Mark A. Behrens & Edward O. Gramling, Improving the Jury System in
Kansas: A Call for Jury Patriotism Legislation, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2003);
Michael S. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of Professional Jurors,
25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 248 (2007) (“The movement to reform jury service was
led by bar associations as well as commissions appointed by courts or legislatures to
examine practices and make recommendations for change. The American Bar
Association played a particularly important role and generated reform efforts in many
states.”).
226
E.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE AND
MANAGEMENT (1993); ARIZONA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF
JURIES, JURORS: THE POWER OF TWELVE (1994), available at http://surpreme.state.az.us/
jury/power12.htm (Arizona); COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PROJECT, JURIES FOR THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND: PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE JURY
SYSTEMS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (1998) (Washington, D.C.); THE JURY PROJECT, REPORT
TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1994) (New York); J. Clark Kelso,
Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 1433 (1996) (California); see Munsterman, supra note 42, at 217-18 (“In 1978 a
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years spanning 1997–2007, three-quarters of the states (38) appointed
a jury reform body to oversee proposed changes.227 These commissions
led to state reforms in dozens of jurisdictions.228
For example, Massachusetts became the first state to institute a
“one-day, one-trial” system.229 A “one-day, one-trial” system is one in
which a juror completes his or her service in one day if he or she is
not selected to serve as a juror in a trial.230 For citizens in
Massachusetts this meant that instead of being summoned for a period
of 20-30 days, jurors only served for a single day or a single trial.231
Nine states and the District of Columbia now have adopted a similar
“one-day, one-trial model.”232 These jurisdictions (Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana,
Massachusetts, and Oklahoma) make up over one quarter of the U.S.
population.233 New York and South Carolina limit jury service to twofive days. Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
task force of representatives from the American Bar Association, the Conference of
Chief Justices, the Conference of State Court Administrators, the National Association
for Trial Court Administrators, The National Association for Court Administration,
and the National Bar Association developed a set of jury standards. . . . As a result of
the implementation of the standards states have introduced the use of multiple lists
for juror selection, eliminated exemptions, changed their juror fees, reduced their
term of jury service, often to one day/one trial, improved the automation support of
the jury system, and improved the treatment of jurors through training for judges and
administrative staff.”).
227
See HON. GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, & NICOLE L. WATERS,
THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM
REPORT 9 (2007).
228
See Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions, supra note 42, at 481 (listing efforts).
229
Munsterman, supra note 42, at 217. See generally Saks, supra note 24, at 225
n.16 (“A jurisdiction using a ‘one-day-one-trial’ jury system requires citizens called for
jury service to serve only for a single day or, if chosen to sit on a jury, for a single
trial.” (citing JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS § II-2 (Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997))).
230
Patricia Lee Refo, A Roadmap for Trials: The Ethical Treatment of Jurors, 36
STETSON L. REV. 821, 824 n.12 (2011) (quoting the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
GLOSSARY, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/glossary_o.html (last accessed Nov. 9,
2006)).
231
Munsterman, supra note 42, at 217 (observing that Massachusetts moved from a
twenty day jury service to a one-day, one-trial system); Pamela J. Wood, Massachusetts
Leadership in the American Jury System, 55-SPG B. B.J. 13, 14 (2011) (“Massachusetts
was the first in the country to implement the One Day or One Trial system statewide,
in the 1980s. Jurors serve for one day or, if impaneled on a case, for the duration of
one trial, after which they are disqualified from service for three years. This is a
significant improvement over the prior system, under which jurors served for 30 days
and might be impaneled on several trials during that time.”).
232
MIZE ET AL., supra note 227, at 10.
233
Id.
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Ohio, and Rhode Island limit jury service to six days-one month.234
These jurisdictions, making up almost half the U.S. population
(46.7%), have all instituted some public notice to potential jurors
about these efficiencies in jury service.235
These improvements directly target the problem of jury
avoidance.236 Courts have long struggled with “juror yield” —
meaning the percentage of people summoned to service who actually
show up.237 Now because jurors can be certain that their time in court
will be limited, more are willing to appear.238 While other barriers to
service still exist,239 these streamlining processes have received a very
positive response from both courts and citizens.
A quick review of these new jury streamlining campaigns shows
how jury duty is marketed as easier, shorter, and less of a burden for
citizens. Many jurisdictions that have adopted jury reform innovations
overtly advertise this reduced burden of citizenship on publically
available websites.240 Judges promote it directly to the public.241 Court
234

Id.
See id. at 11.
236
See Richard Seltzer, The Vanishing Juror: Why Are There Not Enough Available
Jurors?, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 203, 204 (1999) (noting that in 1999 the District of Columbia
jury system “found that approximately 20 percent of jurors ignore the jury
qualification questionnaire and another 40 percent did not receive it at all. Only 18
percent of potential jurors actually serve”); see also id. (“New York City had a
nonresponse rate of 58 percent before they began an enhanced enforcement program.”
(citing NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, JURY REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE: A
PROGRESS REPORT ON A CONTINUING INITIATIVE (1996))).
237
Wood, supra note 231, at 14 (defining “juror yield” as the percentage of people
summoned for jury service that actually appear at the courthouse); see Thomas L.
Fowler, Filling the Box: Responding to Jury Duty Avoidance, 23 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 3
(1997–1998) (“Since colonial days, citizens have sought to avoid jury duty, and
legislatures and court officials have searched for effective methods to secure their
service.”).
238
See generally Wood, supra note 231, at 15 (“Under the One Day or One Trial
system, about 90% of those who appear for jury duty in Massachusetts complete their
service in one day, and over 95% are done in three days or fewer.”).
239
Susan Carol Losh, Adina W. Wasserman & Michael A. Wasserman, Reluctant
Jurors, 83 JUDICATURE 304, 309 (2000) (“There are many obstacles to jury duty: poor
public transit, conflicts with work or school, and child care expenses are just a few.”);
Refo, supra note 230, at 668 (“Many courts across the country are innovating — the
District of Columbia has a child care center in the courthouse, available for jurors and
witnesses with child care needs.”).
240
See, e.g., MACOMB COUNTY, MICHIGAN CLERK’S OFFICE PRESS RELEASE (Nov. 1,
2005), available at http://macombcountymi.gov/clerksoffice/news/htm/OneDayOne
Trialfirstdaysuccess.htm (“Macomb County’s one-day, one-trial jury system started
today and Macomb County Clerk / Register of Deeds Carmella Sabaugh reports a near
record turnout. 188 jurors responded to a jury summons today. Daily juror attendance
235
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systems actively engage reporters and news sources to publicize the
changes.242
These successful innovations offer several insights for this Article.
First, jury reforms were (and are) necessary to improve the overall
jury system. However, the success of those reforms may have had
unintended consequences that has reduced the status of the juror in
society. These programs encouraged the perception that the burden of
jury service is minimal. Almost all of the reform efforts have been
implicitly or explicitly intended to reduce the investment of time and
effort of jurors. Simply stated, advertising that jury service will not be
“too inconvenient” does not elevate the status of jurors.243 Citizens
have necessarily internalized the efforts of judges and court
administrators to lessen the burden of serving. While it is true that
juror improvement/appreciation efforts have resulted in a more juroraverages 150. Today’s attendance percentage was the second highest ever recorded.
The record is 191. Sabaugh attributes the better attendance to the new jury system.
The new system shortens jury duty from one week to just one day for most jurors.”);
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/
portal/page?_pageid=55,1406353&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Jan.
2, 2014) (“The Superior Court uses the ‘One Day/One Trial’ program under California
Rules of Court, rule 2.1002, which is intended to make jury service more convenient
by shortening the time that a person is required to serve to one day or one trial.”).
241
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, MESSAGE FROM CHIEF JUDGE TIMOTHY C. EVANS,
available at http://cookcountycourt.org/jury/message.html (“Jury service is a serious,
meaningful and important responsibility. My goal is to make jury service convenient
and easy. To accomplish this, I have instructed the Office of Jury Administration to
implement innovative and streamlined practices designed to put the comfort and
convenience of jurors first and foremost.”); New Jury Duty System, CORNERSTONE
MEDIA ONLINE (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.russell-publications.com/articles/1293/newjury-duty-system (“In the on-going attempt to make jury duty less burdensome for
citizens in Kankakee County, Chief Judge Kathy Bradshaw Elliott is pleased to
announce the beginning of the one day/one trial system for jury duty.”).
242
See Caitlin Francke, Keeping Jurors from Being Boxed in “One-trial” System Reduces
Service Time, Expands Prospect List, BALTIMORE SUN (May 7, 1996), http://articles.
baltimoresun.com/1996-05-07/news/1996128063_1_jury-pool-court-administratorsexcused (“A new jury system makes it easier to fulfill your civic duty in Howard County,
reducing the required service from one month to one week. The system — planned since
last year and begun last week — means most residents will fill their sometimes dreaded
duty in only one day.”); Bob Merrifield, Jury Duty Revamped in Will County Courts, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 19, 1991), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-11-19/news/9104140935
_1_one-trial-system-jury-duty-jury-commission (detailing changes in county courts); see
also Jan Hoffman, Making Jury Duty Less Painful and More Efficient, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/07/nyregion/making-jury-duty-less-painfuland-more-efficient.html (reporting on improvements in New York State).
243
Or, in other words, the advertising is not “there is nothing more important you
can do than be a constitutional citizen” but instead, “don’t worry, it won’t be hard and
you can go back to more important things in life.”
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focused experience, the message is still one of reduced burdens and
expectations.
Second, these programs intentionally have focused attention on a
limited timeframe. Program titles like “one-day, one-trial” suggest that
the role is discrete and defined, not ongoing. There is no
acknowledgment that being a juror involves a political or
constitutional identity outside the courthouse.
Third, the perception has been created that jury service is something
citizens do for the courts, not themselves — that jury trials are
established by the court, not the Constitution. This is a significant
shift in the source of jury power. In essence, juries have become seen
as a fact-finding arm of the court, not a separate institution in the
constitutional structure.
Finally, these modifications, emphasizing the easy or limited role of
the jury, have discouraged any discussion that jurors might have
responsibilities before jury service to understand and prepare for their
role, or any connection after jury service to share that knowledge with
the larger community. The perception remains that all you have to do
is show up, which again limits the sense that jury duty is part of an
ongoing civic identity.
D. Result: A Task-Oriented Institution
The result of these relatively recent changes in the jury system, in
addition to larger systemic changes in role, has led to a task-oriented
institution.244 While still an important task, this shrinking of role has
undermined a broader sense of constitutional identity. In contrast to a
constitutionally-oriented jury, the modern jury is perceived to require
less effort, less time, no preparation, and is relatively unimportant in
comparison to other responsibilities.
Of course, these changes discussed above are not the sole cause of
the jury’s diminished status in society. Within the court system, rules
of evidence and trial practice have also undercut a more engaged
jury.245 Jurors are, by and large, passive recipients of information.246
Many trial procedures are not well explained to citizens. Outside
court, financial pressures and other obligations of citizens have
244
See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 23, at 796 (recognizing that “task-oriented
reforms have also recently emerged from some court systems and judges”).
245
Steven L. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding
Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 190, 208 (1990) (discussing trial restrictions that seem to
diminish the role of the jury and make the jury’s role more passive).
246
See Leigh Buchanan Blenen, The Appearance of Justice: Juries, Judges, and the
Media Transcript, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1096, 1113 (1996).
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increased the cost of serving.247 Further, unlike voting, jury service
involves no apparent self-interest, thus making the value of service
harder to appreciate.248 Finally, there has been no national education
project to explain why juries matter.249 While efforts to engage and
uplift jurors continue in court systems and within bar associations,
jurors have internalized the message of a weakened institution.
Why does this change in orientation matter? The consequences of
this task-oriented role have tracked several troubling developments
about the strength of the jury system. First, jurors have been
challenged as not being up to the job.250 This, in turn, has led to a
sustained attack on the jury, with some commentators celebrating the
death of the civil jury.251 The result has undermined jury participation
rates, with jury yield numbers at embarrassingly low levels.252 Finally,
while it is difficult to measure citizen attitudes about jury service, it
seems that jury service remains a dreaded duty253 that is representative
247
Judge Scott Donaldson, Improving Jury Service, 73 ALA. LAW. 190, 191 (2012)
(discussing the problems of juror pay).
248
Losh et al., supra note 239, at 309 (“The ramifications of ‘jury economics’
extend beyond wages. Unlike other forms of civic involvement (e.g., voting), which
partially draw on self-interest, the rewards of jury duty involve the internal
satisfaction of fulfilling a civic obligation.”).
249
Id. at 310 (“Jury duty is unfamiliar territory for most. Our youth are taught
about other civic duties, most notably the vote, and public service advertising about
voting is pervasive. Meanwhile, information about jury duty is confined to fiction,
sensationalist trials, personal experience, or second-hand data.”).
250
Public polling of civil juries was quite negative with regard to awards of
excessive monetary damages. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 24, at 222 (citing VALERIE P.
HANS, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CIVIL JURY, IN VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
248 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)).
251
See Jeffrey Robert White, The Civil Jury: 200 Years Under Siege, 36-JUN TRIAL 18
(2000) (detailing the various attacks on the institution of the jury from the
perspective of the trial bar).
252
Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in
Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2001) (describing a survey in which
“Dallas County officials mailed out 13,027 summonses in anticipation of the fifty-five
civil and criminal trials scheduled to begin the week of March 6, 2000. An additional
585 people — not included in the mail-out figure — were expected to show up at the
courthouse because they had answered summonses for earlier court dates but asked to
reschedule to this date. Of the 13,612 who were supposed to show up for jury service,
only 2214 did.”).
253
“Everyone loves jury service — just not this week.” Refo, supra note 230, at 667
(quoting Tom Munsterman from the National Center for State Courts); WASHINGTON
STATE JURY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE BOARD FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 3 (2000),
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/Jury_Commission_Report.pdf
(“The arrival of a jury summons in the mailbox is rarely greeted with enthusiasm: jury
duty is inconvenient; it interferes with work; it does not pay well and may cause a loss
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of a general decline in civic engagement.254 While such relationships
are not necessarily causal (and are likely too complex to link), the
solutions proposed in this Article seek to improve these negative
attitudes. As will be discussed in the next section, a reframing of jury
service to emphasize its constitutional character will address these
concerns.
III. THE POTENTIALITY OF JURY SERVICE
The question to be answered is how to reclaim the benefits of the
jury’s traditional, constitutional identity without running up against
the real problems that caused the courts to limit the role of the jury in
the first place. The proposed answer is not to disturb the changes
made to improve the modern jury. Instead, this Article looks to affect
jury service before and after the event and, thus, to reframe it as an
ongoing, constitutional identity. In a separate article, I have proposed
re-crafting jury instructions (within the jury experience) to facilitate a
similar goal.255
Becoming aware of the potentiality of jury service involves two
interrelated steps. First, it requires a change in perception so that
being a juror is seen as an important, on-going constitutional identity,
and not simply a discrete task. Recognition of this constitutional
connection will have tangible benefits for the reputation and
effectiveness of juries. Second, it requires personal and civic
engagement before and after jury service. Potential jurors should be
encouraged to educate themselves about the constitutional role of the
jury prior to serving. Jurors who have served should be encouraged to
reflect on and teach others from this experience. Courts and
communities should promote this civic investment in the jury role. So
conceived, being a juror, will not begin or end with the actual service,
but will be seen as part of a continuum of civic responsibilities.
A. Changing the Expectations of Jury Service
This Article seeks to reframe the idea of jury service into a broader
constitutional identity. This involves shifting the expectations of
modern jurors back to a more constitutionally-oriented focus. The
first part of this section sets out the “what” and “why” — what is
of income; and it sometimes means waiting in a less than congenial or comfortable
environment.”).
254
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 25 (2000).
255
See Ferguson, supra note 9, at 286-96.

2014]

The Jury as Constitutional Identity

1153

meant by changing expectations and why it is important. The second
section offers suggestions on “how” — how to make this potentiality
of jury service an actuality.
1.

Reimagining the Importance of Jury Service

The first change in expectation involves elevating the juror’s
importance in society. From the Revolutionary War to the Civil Rights
Movement, the right to serve on a jury was a marker of full
constitutional citizenship.256 Then, as now, jury duty was a
constitutional duty. Yet, how many ordinary citizens waiting in line at
the local courthouse would risk death or arrest to protest for the right
to serve on a jury? How many citizens even know about the battles to
establish jury service as a constitutional right? Without a sense of
constitutional identity, the average citizen will understandably
overlook the importance of the experience. The first step then is to
make jurors aware of the value of jury service by reminding them of
this past constitutional connection. This is not a mere history lesson,
but a linkage to the constitutional mythology of America. If citizens
see jury duty as constitutional duty, it becomes of elevated
importance.
This constitutional linkage will not only shape how potential jurors
react to the summons, but will shape how jurors act during jury
service. Jurors are not mere fact-finders, but fact-finders within a
constitutional structure. As such, they must see that jury service is a
connecting point to the larger constitutional system.257 Simply stated, a
juror that has embraced this constitutional identity will approach jury
duty with the understanding that he or she has been deputized to act
in a constitutional system. It is a great and unfamiliar power. It is also
a democratic power. It instills a heightened sense of seriousness,
purpose, and respect for the institution.258 After all, as a juror you are
symbolically sitting in the seats of those who fought for the right. It
might not change the outcome in any particular case, but it will
improve and legitimize the process and the ultimate decision.
To be clear, while there may be some perceived overlap with
theories that have tried to reclaim the law-finding nature of the jury,
this proposal stops well short of that argument. The idea is not to give
the jury the authority to decide the law, but the vision to understand
256

See supra Part I.A-B.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968); see also Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 (1975).
258
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
257
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its role within the constitutional structure. An informed juror can both
understand the history and original power of the jury and still find the
facts as instructed. Judges, lawyers, and legal historians sit on juries all
the time and do not alter their decisions because they know about the
history of the jury. Yet, this contextual understanding of the role of
the jury may well enrich the experience by placing the juror’s decision
in a larger constitutional framework.259
2.

Expanding the Temporal Understanding of Jury Service

The second change in expectation involves considering jury service
as a status or identity that extends beyond the time at the courthouse.
It looks at the responsibilities of a citizen as a potential juror.
Before jury service, all potential jurors know that as actual jurors
they will be called on to do certain actions within an established
system. That role will require certain knowledge, including some
understanding of substantive law, procedural rules, and the
constitutional structure of decision. Recognizing this reality, one
would think that jurors would prepare for the event by learning about
it. Yet, there is no institutional educational program for jurors prior to
service and most jurors do not educate themselves. The reason for this
lack of preparation turns on the fact that jurors do not see their job as
having quite yet begun. Being a juror is equated with the courthouse,
not an identity outside those courthouse responsibilities.
Another way to think about what an ongoing constitutional identity
might mean is to ask the question: why among the twin political rights
of voting and jury service, has jury service not attached to our modern
identity? After all, when citizens consider what it means “to be a
voter” they are not simply focused on checking the box (or pulling the
handle) to vote in a voting booth. The physical act of voting does not
delimit the identity of being a voter. Instead, their identity as voters
includes all of the educative and identifying qualities that go into
voting before choosing a candidate. At least in the ideal,260 voters
259
This contextual understanding recognizes that the jury: (1) derives from a
shared history and tradition; (2) embodies shared values of fairness, equality,
accountability, deliberation, liberty, dissent; (3) expresses collective beliefs of process
and decision; (4) requires participation in shared rituals; (5) is based on a shared
language; (6) represents a collective responsibility for all similarly situated citizens;
(7) involves local community power; and (8) perpetrates a recognizable and
achievable self-image. Each of these factors adds weight to the responsibility of the
juror.
260
It is well recognized that voting participation in America is not near the ideal.
Local election turnouts are usually under 50% of eligible voters. According to the Pew
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educate themselves about the issues, weigh personal and political
values, and balance party affiliations, personal self-interest, and public
virtue all before (and sometimes after) they vote. Being a participatory
voter in a democracy is part of our identity before and after the act of
voting; being a participatory juror in a democracy is not. Yet, all
citizens are also potential jurors.261 All citizens, thus, should have a
responsibility before and after the actual jury summons to educate
themselves about this constitutional responsibility. That jury service,
like voting, is a “badge of citizenship”262 is not a new idea — the
conceptual move here is to convince citizens that they are wearing that
badge before they pin on the actual juror badge.
To make this shift complete, there also needs to be a change in
expectation to counter the message that jury service has a defined end
point. While part of jury service might end after one-day or one-trial,
there are other parts that continue in terms of education, perception,
and attitudes.263 This is the subject of the next section.
B. The Benefits of Changing the Expectation of Jury Service
What are the benefits of this changed expectation? After all, if one is
satisfied with the fact-finding role of the modern jury, why do citizens
need to be concerned about constitutional identity?
1.

Reputational Benefit

There are several significant benefits to emphasizing the
constitutional identity of the jury. The first is reputational. A broader
conception of juror identity helps legitimize the jury process to a
doubting public. One of the current complaints about the jury is that
it is comprised of citizens not competent to handle the
responsibilities.264 This attack on jurors spills over to attacks on the
Center, 61% of eligible voters voted in the 2008 presidential election (a 40-year high).
PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, 2008 ELECTION IN REVIEW 4 (2008).
261
But see Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
65, 67 (2003) (observing that some groups, such as felons, are excluded as a matter of
law).
262
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 234 (1974)
(recognizing the right to vote as an “important badge of citizenship” (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
263
See infra Part III.B.4.
264
Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 23, at 792 (“A major theme of popular
criticism is that competent, responsible people rarely serve on juries; instead,
American juries are made up of incompetent people — the uneducated, the jobless,
the people who pay so little attention to the news that they have never heard of
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jury system.265 The more jury service is seen as the work of
constitutional actors, the more respect will be given the institution.
This is true for two separate reasons (in addition to the already
mentioned theory that anything is considered more important if
“constitutionalized”).266 The first is that it shifts the focus from the
people to the process. The focus becomes the stable constitutional
process of jury decision-making, and not the actual people on the
jury.267 Outlier decisions can be rationalized by process considerations,
as we do with many generally good processes that have occasional
problems.
Second, it repositions the jury within the larger democratic
structure. Citizens see jurors, and jurors see themselves, as a powerful,
generative part of the legal structure with significant constitutional
power.268 Jurors represent the community, but they also represent a
community voice in tension with governmental power. Attacking a
jury verdict is a little like attacking democratic voting outcomes; you
have no one to blame but yourself.
A related benefit is that an improved reputation may result in
improved jury yields. As discussed earlier, one of the current realities
of the modern jury system is a low turnout for summoned jurors to
jury service.269 To efficiently function as a court system, courts need to
encourage juror participation. With reduced participation from poor
jury yields, certain citizens will be overburdened or there will be an
inadequate number of jurors. The current poor yields have caused
judges to complain,270 issue contempt citations,271 and resort to public
litigants who are major public figures.”); Friedland, supra note 245, at 191-92.
265
Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr., Frank D. Zielinski & George M. Curtiss, III, A
Bicentennial Transition: Modern Alternatives to Seventh Amendment Jury Trial in Complex
Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 91 (1988). But see Cecil et al., supra note 23, at 764.
266
See supra text accompanying note 257.
267
See Friedland, supra note 245, at 195 (“This perception of fairness is as
important to the proceedings as is actual fairness. A system perceived as inaccurate
undermines the public’s confidence in the jury to reach fair — and accurate —
results.”).
268
See Young, supra note 25, at 70 (“The very structural bedrock of our
constitutional form of government confirms the centrality of the jury’s role.”).
269
See supra notes 236-238.
270
See, e.g., Jill Monier, Courts Get Tough on Jury Duty No-Shows, FOX 10 NEWS,
July 20, 2013 (“‘I take jury service very seriously,’ said Judge Janet Barton, Superior
Court Judge. Judge Janet Barton says 56 percent of people are not showing up for jury
duty. ‘If we have sufficient numbers of no shows we could be in a position where we
can’t empanel a jury. Defendants have speedy trial rights,’ said Judge Barton.”),
available at http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/story/22890240/2013/07/20/courts-gettough-on-jury-duty-no-shows.
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service announcements directed at uplifting the perception of jury
service.272 If jury duty is considered a constitutional duty, this job of
recruitment becomes slightly easier. Obviously, not everyone will feel
patriotic about their civic duty, but the constitutional gloss of jury
service may help in the margins.
2.

Educational Benefit

The second benefit of a changed expectation focuses on the
educational role of juries.273 Juries provide a place of civic learning for
citizens where constitutional principles are translated into actual
decisions.274 To be a moment of constitutional translation, the
translator-citizens must be informed of the vocabulary, context, and
underlying structure of the task at hand. Without an intentional focus
on the constitutional role of the jury, jurors fail to appreciate how the
institution of the jury teaches the skills of democracy or provides the
opportunity to participate in the experiment of self-government.275
Without preparation, jurors simply miss the constitutionally created
teaching moment, because they do not see themselves as anything
other than problem-solvers. This education about constitutional
identity could take place both before and after the actual jury service.
At a minimum, this educational focus should create more
knowledgeable citizens about civic principles.276 People would be
more likely to understand the constitutional structure and the relevant
stakeholders and roles in the criminal justice system.277 It is actually
271

See id. at 5.
See supra notes 240-241.
273
Judith S. Kaye, Why Juries? Looking Back, Looking Ahead, 1:2 J. COURT
INNOVATION 184, 186 (2008) (“Jury service is an opportunity like no other to educate
the public about the justice system. This will, for many people, be their only real-life
encounter with the courts.”); see also Hon. B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and
“Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1244-45
(1993) (recognizing the teaching parallels of jury service and formal education).
274
See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY 4 (2010); 1 TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 37, at 285.
275
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
276
Seth Schiesel, Former Justice Promotes Web-Based Civics Lessons, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2008, at E7 (“‘Knowledge about our government is not handed down through
the gene pool. Every generation has to learn it, and we have some work to do.’ . . .
‘The overwhelming consensus coming out of that conference [on constitutional
literacy],’ [Justice Sandra Day O’Connor] reported, ‘was that public education is the
only long-term solution to preserving . . . a robust constitutional democracy.’”).
277
In fact, one of the innovations that has been developed over the years in some
jurisdictions is to instruct the jury before the case begins on the legal terms that will
be at issue. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions, supra note 41, at 498-99 (“Among its
272
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somewhat striking that we impose essentially no prerequisites or
qualifications (save age and citizenship)278 to decide on the life,
liberty, or property of litigants.279 In an era in which average
Americans regularly flunk the United States citizenship test,280 it might
be necessary to provide some basic education before jury service. This
information is not meant to exclude, but equalize.281 Obviously, one of
the virtues of the modern jury is the diversity and backgrounds of the
various individuals participating. However, from a constitutional
knowledge perspective, most jurors are equally ignorant.282 Adding
some constitutional instruction before arriving in court would level
the playing field during deliberations.
But its real value would be its impact on improving the jury process.
Constitutional knowledge will create a better deliberative experience.
Much of jury instruction discussions revolve around difficult legal
concepts such as “beyond a reasonable doubt,” “the burden of proof,”
“negligence,” or “reasonableness.”283 Why should a juror be
confronted with thinking about such legal terms for the first time in
the jury room? It would create better jury deliberations if people had
reforms were preliminary jury instructions in which judges give jurors background
about the relevant substantive law or standards of proof as well as other matters that
might be useful. The goal is to ‘assist jurors in organizing and understanding the
evidence as they hear it, improve their recall, and reduce the chances of their applying
an erroneous rule to the evidence.’ Empirical studies have found that instructions at
the beginning and end of the trial help jurors to focus on relevant evidence and
remember it, to follow the law, and to feel more satisfied with their jury experience.”).
278
There are also residency requirements, certain English literacy requirements,
and the requirement that you not have criminal charges, or physical or mental
impairments that might interfere with jury service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012).
279
Felony convictions can also preclude individuals from jury service. Kalt, supra
note 261, at 67.
280
Previous covers of Newsweek and the ABA Journal decried the woeful state of
“civics” knowledge among the American public. See Mark Hansen, Flunking Civics:
Why America’s Kids Know So Little, ABA JOURNAL (May 1, 2011), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/civics/; Brian Braiker, Dunce-Cap Nation,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 2007 (discussing the “disheartening results” of a Newsweek poll
on Americans’ knowledge of current events, history, and cultural literacy).
281
“I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people
themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control
with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform
their discretion.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28,
1820), available at http://www.yamaguchy.com/library/Jefferson/Jarvis.html.
282
The statistics and studies on civic knowledge in America are quite troubling.
Eric Lane, Are We Still Americans?, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 15 (2007).
283
Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury Instructions, And
Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 705 (2000); Marder, Bringing Jury
Instructions, supra note 41, at 507 n.259; Tiersma, supra note 41, at 1101-10.
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thought about the terms before they were asked to apply those
difficult concepts in a real case with real consequences.284 Scholars
have long recognized that jurors do not magically grasp complex
concepts in the law by reading form jury instructions.285
Social science research provides ample evidence that the
greatest weakness of juries is their lack of understanding of the
law. Most surprising jury decisions are not the result of a
careful analysis of the law and a principled–or even an
unprincipled–decision to ignore it, but of an inability to figure
out what the instructions mean in the first place. Jurors work
hard to understand the instructions, spending 20 percent or
more of their deliberations discussing the law, feel frustrated,
and sometimes ask for help but rarely get it. They finally
muddle through with what seems like a plausible
interpretation, an interpretation that is often incorrect.286
Some jurors start out misinformed and some end up completely
confused in their understandings.287 While we can hope this erroneous
understanding is cured by careful jury instructions and reasoned
arguments by counsel, this does not always occur.288
Finally, juror education would personally empower jurors who
might otherwise not fully contribute to deliberations due to
unfamiliarity, confusion, or a fear of showing ignorance in front of
their peers. For a first-time juror without any prior experience,
context, or legal training, the concepts and responsibilities can be
overwhelming.289 Early juror education can help remove the feeling of
disempowerment. Specific knowledge about jury service will give
jurors confidence to debate and discuss difficult issues. Finally, the
focus on outside learning necessarily shifts some of the deliberation to
284
Julianna C. Chomos et al., Increasing Juror Satisfaction: A Call to Action for
Judges and Researchers, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 707, 719 (2011) (“Often, jurors know very
little about the law relevant to a case prior to the end of a trial, and they may not
understand the instructions they are given. This can add to the stress of jury service.
Research shows this stress may be alleviated by a more thorough pretrial orientation
on the relevant law of the case.”).
285
Tiersma, supra note 41, at 1101-10.
286
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Jury Reform at the End of the Century: Real Agreement, Real
Changes, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 213, 222 (1999).
287
Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 23, at 800 (noting that “jurors often come into
court with their own (frequently erroneous) preexisting knowledge frameworks about
the law”).
288
See id. at 798-800.
289
See id.
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the community context of what and where jurors learned about the
jury. In so doing, it links the experience in court to the educational
experience outside of court, reinforcing that these are democratic
lessons useful for and related to other civic purposes.
3.

Process Benefit

Juror instruction about role also yields procedural benefits. One of
the most striking commonalities from studying jurors’ self-reported
experiences is that jury service is disorienting.290 This disorienting
experience can be remedied by actual orientation.291 By orientation, I
do not mean instructions on the basics of where to show up, what to
bring, what to wear, how long it will take, etc. This is necessary, but
not sufficient. Even with a smart video or live instruction, jurors are
still disoriented by the process, because they are being asked to do
something they have never done before. Lawyers and judges might be
used to the deliberative process of applying law to facts, reasoned
discussion, and weighty decisions based on a rule of law, but not
everyone is so trained.292 The question is how to overcome this
disorienting sense and learn from it.293
Again, instruction of what to expect both procedurally and
personally would help orient jurors to the experience.294 In some
290
See Chomos et al., supra note 284, at 712 (“Lack of information regarding jury
service may be a source of stress and dissatisfaction for many jurors.”).
291
Id. at 712-13 (2011) (“Overall, jurors have positive perceptions of orientation
materials. For instance, jurors who were randomly selected to view a juror orientation
videotape had significantly higher knowledge of courtroom procedures, felt more
comfortable and confident in their role as jurors, and had more positive attitudes
toward jury service than jurors who did not view the videotape.” (citing Gregory S.
Bradshaw et al., Fostering Juror Comfort: Effects of an Orientation Videotape, 29 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 457, 461-63 (2005))).
292
Christopher N. May, “What Do We Do Now?”: Helping Juries Apply the
Instructions, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 870 (1995) (“What it comes down to is that
these juries did not know how to apply the law to the facts. I have been teaching law
for more than twenty years; the problem that these juries faced is identical to that
which confounds most law students — sometimes well into the second year. Lay
jurors, who have received no more than an hour or two of legal instruction, cannot be
expected to perform better than those who have studied diligently for months. It is all
too easy for those of us who are lawyers or judges to forget what the world looked like
before we entered law school.”).
293
See Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the
Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 40-42 (1995);
Deborah Schatz, The Trials of a Juror, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 198, 199 (1977) (recounting the
personal experience of a juror who felt “nervous and disoriented”).
294
Cf. HON. JOSEPH T. CLARK, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF OHIO TASK FORCE ON JURY SERVICE 13 (2004), available at http://www.
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jurisdictions before the advent of the jury reforms, when long jury
service was the norm, it would fall on the more experienced jurors to
explain to the new jurors what to expect.295 In other jurisdictions, a
more formal briefing system — poorly titled an “indoctrination
process” — would be provided.296 Handouts or other materials were
provided on a regular basis.297 These processes were both eventually
changed, in part, because of the concern that past jurors might
prejudice future jurors about the experience, or information would be
provided to jurors without the parties present. This is, obviously, still
a real concern. However, it would be minimized if the orientation
happened well before the moment of jury duty so as to not interfere
with the court’s established process.
Such an orientation process is supported by learning theory that
shows that providing information about the jury before actual service
benefits jurors’ comprehension.298 At least within the jury trial context,
early jury instructions increase comprehension.299 Such findings are
not surprising and are seen in other educational contexts in which
orientation is critical to substantive comprehension and procedural
satisfaction.300

supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/juryTF/jurytf_proposal.pdf (“The Task Force
recommends that jurors are entitled to receive preliminary instructions on some
aspects of the law and procedure prior to the taking of evidence in a case. Consistent
with the previous recommendation, these instructions should be provided to the jury
in writing. Fundamentally these instructions should include an introduction of the
parties and their claims, guidance on the governing legal principles and information
on the role of the jury.”).
295
See Daniel Schorr, A Newsman’s Reflection on Jury Service, 2 LITIG. 24, 24
(1976).
296
D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Indoctrination by Court of Persons Summoned for Jury
Service, 89 A.L.R.2d 197, 201 n.1 (1963).
297
See Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit
Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 861 (2012) (“[J]uror orientation programs are ‘haphazard
and vary from state to state, county to county, and court to court . . . .’ Many courts
play a videotape or DVD in the room where potential jurors sit and wait for jury
service, or, more typically, for dismissal. Prospective jurors pay more attention to the
videos than to the juror handbooks that were previously the norm.”).
298
See Elizabeth Najdovski-Terziovski et al., What Are We Doing Here? An Analysis
of Juror Orientation Programs, 92 JUDICATURE 70, 70 (2008) (“[W]hile there is a
plethora of research on juror comprehension and decision making, the literature on
juror orientation is virtually nonexistent.”). Of course, the instruction discussed is
within the context of the jury service, but the same principles of orientation apply.
299
Dann, supra note 273, at 1249.
300
See, e.g., Paula Lustbader, You Are Not in Kansas Anymore: Orientation Programs
Can Help Students Fly Over the Rainbow, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 346 (2008).
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Systemic Benefit

Thinking of jury service along a continuum of civic life also changes
the lessons to be learned. Citizens may begin to see jury service as an
iterative process, learning from past experience and connected to the
larger civic structure. Scholars who have studied early juries saw this
same interchange with knowledge gained on jury service rubbing off
on experiences outside of jury service. “The courthouse doors swung
both ways. Jurors brought their common knowledge and left
instructed. Having witnessed the court’s activities, they imparted the
lessons learned to their community.”301 Or as Tocqueville famously
stated: “I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who have
lawsuits, but I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who judge
them; and I look upon it as one of the most efficacious means for the
education of the people which society can employ.”302
Considering jury duty as a constitutional identity would open up a
discussion along a continuum, recognizing that many citizens will be
repeat players in the system.303 Currently, we treat these jurors as if
they had never served, failing to use their experience and knowledge
from prior service.304 Ignoring that jurors are repeat players in the jury
system has several negative impacts.
First, we assume that there are no best practices to learn from the
jury experience.305 This is probably untrue as a matter of practice, as
successful deliberations share many similarities in terms of attitudes of
civility, open-mindedness, attention to detail, etc.306 This assumption
is certainly untrue as a matter of scholarly research into deliberative

301

Blinka, supra note 85, at 562.
1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 37, at 285.
303
See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare, A Portrait of the
Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 735 (2006) (“In an analysis of over a thousand qualified
members of the jury pool in Cook County, Diamond and Casper found that 18.1% of
jurors reported that they had previously served on a jury.”).
304
This is similar to the way juries used to operate when they heard case after case
and developed an expertise in the subject matter area. See Smith, supra note 30, at 460.
305
Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions, supra note 41, at 503 (“Judges tend not to
instruct juries on how they should conduct their deliberations, but this is one area in
which jurors have expressed the need for some guidance.”).
306
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the
Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589, 1619
(2006) (“Jury service also may help to inculcate in jurors traits necessary to good
citizenship, specifically, the willingness to compromise, to see another person’s
perspective, and to accept the need for change. They practice engaging in individual
and collective self-rule — informed, norm-governed judgment — lessons they bring
with them into the wider world.”).
302
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decision-making.307 While there are arguments to be made about not
wanting to influence jury deliberations with past experiences, the
system loses out by not studying what works and why. Experiential
building blocks are developed in each jury experience — skills that
can be of use in future service or in other constitutional pursuits.
Expanding the idea of the juror as being a repeat player impacted by
past jury experiences, and capable of reflecting on those experiences,
would open avenues to improve the jury experience for all potential
jurors.
Second, treating jury duty as a task to be completed (without any
continuing systemic connection) results in a loss of the public voice of
the juror. One of the repeated findings of jury scholars is that those
citizens who have completed a jury trial (as an actual participating
juror) have a positive feeling about the experience.308 Yet, despite this
reality, the overall societal attitude toward jury service is negative.309
One reason for this disconnect is that the positive voice of experience
is never heard. In fact, there is no place in the modern jury system for
307
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 40, 66 (2004);
Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through Participation: A
Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 669-670 (2011);
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
205, 206, 217 (1989); David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What Happened
on Deliberation Day, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 936-37 (2007). But see Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 102-03 (2000).
308
Chomos et al., supra note 284, at 709-10 (“[R]esearch shows Americans
generally are positive about jury service, and this positive attitude increases after
service. An NCSC study supports this conclusion, finding most jurors did not view
jury service as a waste of time and were willing to serve on another jury in the future.
These views were even more positive among those who actually served on a jury, as
compared to those who were called but not selected. . . . The study also revealed the
experience of jury service increased positive attitudes.”); see also WASHINGTON STATE
JURY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE BOARD FOR JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, at
Recommendations 3 (July 2000), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/
pdf/Jury_Commission_Report.pdf (“Surprisingly, . . . citizens who have served on a
jury in the past are rarely reluctant to serve again. Jurors are positive about their
service and usually find the experience rewarding. They generally come away with a
positive attitude towards the justice system.”).
309
See Judge Paul J. Garotto, Jury Service — A Citizen’s Duty, Speech before the
Omaha Bar Association (Sept. 24, 1964), in 13 NEB. ST. B.J. 111, 112 (1964) (“Jury
service is a duty that most citizens apparently seek to avoid, or wish they could. It is
the kind of basic common experience that all citizens, bar none, should have at least
once. . . . [S]itting through a trial as a member of the jury, and then seeking with the
other eleven jurors to reach a just and fair and unanimous verdict is a very
enlightening and enriching experience.”); id. at 113 (“What else do we have that can
teach, exercise, and strengthen so much political, social, moral and religious virtue as
does serving on a jury.”).
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it to be heard. Jurors finish their job and silently dissolve back into
society.310 This is a loss for the court system as those stories of hard
work, the pride of service, and the sense of accomplishment are all
lost. Some jurors have life-changing positive experiences that no one
except family or close friends hear about.311 The development of a
public forum for post-trial positive jury reflections (with an eye
toward future jurors) can only improve jury yields and attitudes about
jury service in general.312
At the other end of the experience spectrum, there are many jurors
who have a difficult time deciding. Jurors regularly confront heartwrenching, morally challenging, and tragic cases, which creates
significant personal stress.313 In addition, jurors may have to accept
responsibility for sending a defendant to jail or even death. As Justice
David Souter acknowledged: “Jury duty is usually unsought and
sometimes resisted, and it may be as difficult for one juror suddenly to
face the findings that can send another human being to prison, as it is
for another to hold out conscientiously for acquittal.”314 Yet, despite
the emotional investment and sometimes emotional trauma, the court
system rarely provides space for reflection, catharsis, or healing. Some
jurors report post-traumatic stress disorder-like symptoms,315 and
others less dramatically suffer doubts and questioning. This
uncertainty and unsettledness could be addressed by a post-juror
opportunity for discussion or reflection (if not counseling).316
310
United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942)
(writing about the jury, Judge Learned Hand remarked, “The individual can forfeit his
liberty — to say nothing of his life — only at the hands of those who, unlike any
official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at
once separate and melt anonymously in the community from which they came.”).
311
See Jack Kaplan, In Praise of Juries: A Personal Experience, 51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 384,
385 (1979) (“As the discussion wore on, the jury was slowly transformed before my
very eyes into the most amazing instrument of justice I have ever seen. It was
exhilarating. It left me profoundly proud to be an American and to have the privilege
of participating in such an adventure.”).
312
See Sanford Levinson, What Should Citizens (as Participants in a Republican Form
of Government) Know About the Constitution?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1239, 1247
(2009) (“Citizens in a constitutional republic must be able to engage in critical
reflection about their government, a task far more important than being able to offer
rote answers to questions about constitutional formalities.”).
313
See CLARK, supra note 294, at 20 (“The Task Force recommends counseling
services be made available to jurors after especially stressful trials.”).
314
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997).
315
See, e.g., Michael E. Antonio, “I Didn’t Know It’d Be So Hard”: Jurors Emotional
Reactions to Serving on a Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 282, 283 (2006) (comparing
symptoms of jurors in a death penalty trial to PTSD symptoms).
316
CLARK, supra note 294, at 2.
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Sometimes jurors just have basic questions about things they saw and
experienced, and want to ask questions about it to overcome the sense
of disorientation and to achieve closure.317 Such a forum would be
beneficial for the experienced juror who may well be a juror again in
the future, as well as, to prepare other potential jurors. Jurors can
prepare for, contextualize, and understand the weight of this personal
judgment. It will provide a moment to reflect on the past service
which may contribute to future deliberations.318
Finally, by ignoring the constitutional identity of jury service, jurors
do not see the connection of their service to other democratic
responsibilities.319 With a sense of constitutional connection, jurors
can become inspired to replicate their civic success in other civic
forums.320 In fact, The Washington State Jury Project led by John
Gastil has demonstrated a significant correlation between jury service
and democratic engagement.321 After an exhaustive study of jurors to
determine whether their jury experience had any effect on other civic
activities, the studies show that citizens who serve as jurors in
criminal cases, also tended to vote more often, and participate in other
civic-minded activities.322

317
Chomos et al., supra note 284, at 728 (“After the trial is finished, jurors may
have questions regarding aspects of the legal system or general comments about their
experience as a juror. Failure to address these concerns may lead jurors to think the
courts do not care about their opinions.”).
318
See Collin, supra note 113, at 82 (“Madisonian democratic theory relies on the
role of deliberation between interest groups in order to refine contemporary issues,
and develop evolving local solutions.”).
319
Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 342 (“Deliberative forums serve democracy more
broadly in that they impart a sense of political purpose on the participants. By
engaging ordinary citizens in government, deliberative democracy gives these citizens
confidence about their ability to influence political decisions and thus increases their
willingness to participate in politics even after the end of their jury service. Face-toface deliberation thus reinforces the very skills and qualities on which it thrives.”).
320
Id. at 350 (“Studies of citizens’ juries show even more encouraging results —
that not only a consensual outcome, but also mere deliberation, favorably changes
jurors’ attitudes toward political activity. The evidence from these experiments reveals
that some ‘jurors are more civically active long after the jury process has ended.’”
(citing Graham Smith & Corinne Wales, Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy,
48 POL. STUD. 51, 60 (2000))).
321
GASTIL ET AL., supra note 274, at 4; John Gastil, E. Pierre Deess & Phil Weiser,
Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Connection Between Jury Deliberation
and Political Participation, 64 J. POL. 585, 592 (2002); John Gastil & Phillip J. Weiser,
Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing the Civic Value of Institutionalized
Deliberation, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 605, 614 (2006).
322
See sources cited supra note 321.
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C. Strengthening Juror Identity
How can the current perception of jury service be changed without
undermining the existing jury system? One answer involves looking at
mechanisms of change outside of the current jury process. If viewed as
a broader constitutional identity, potential jurors can take concrete
steps to prepare for jury service before the actual summons. In
addition, jurors who have finished their service can take steps to
improve future jury experiences for both themselves and others in
their community.
The following considerations make no claim to be exhaustive,
merely exploratory, seeking to open up questions about how to
capitalize on a broader vision of jury service. The suggestions
primarily focus on education and reflection, but this emphasis does
not mean to suggest that other more social or dynamic methods
should not be tried. Developing the potentiality of jury service into a
strong constitutional identity will, like the jury, be a collective effort.
1.

Formal Constitutional Education Efforts

One straightforward proposal would be to educate citizens about the
constitutional context.323 If a consequence of the task-oriented jury
has been to lose a sense of larger constitutional connection, one direct
remedy would be to teach that constitutional role to potential
jurors.324 The history of juries in America is not a secret history. It
should not be consciously hidden from modern jurors. Both the myth
and reality could be explained in clear terms, similar to a high school
civics textbook.325 Highlighting the jury’s importance at constitutional
moments, including the founding, as well as some of its tragic
limitations in application, can only heighten the jurors’ appreciation of
their service.326 If crafted appropriately, there is nothing objectionable
323
Hirsch, supra note 12, at 209-10 (“Unless citizens develop sufficient knowledge,
independence, and public-spiritedness, they cannot handle the responsibilities of selfgovernment.”).
324
“But how do we address the fact that New Yorkers for the most part are
unaware of the role of the courts in their daily lives? That is a challenge I put to the
Bar: help us build a citizenry that is better informed about all three branches of
government, but especially about the courts, which of necessity — and, I must admit,
habit — remain somewhat remote and detached.” Judith S. Kaye, My Life as Chief
Judge: The Chapter on Juries, 78-OCT N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 11 (2006).
325
See, e.g., JAMIN RASKIN ET AL., YOUTH JUSTICE IN AMERICA, at xi (2005) (describing
the Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project and how high school students
are learning about civics through selections of the Constitution).
326
See Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 23, at 796 (“Providing relevant
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about informing jurors of the historical and constitutional context of
the jury’s role.327
This education project could be done through technology, via the
internet or mobile devices, or other media. It could include self-guided
videos, interactive spaces of communication, and easily digestible
information.328 Online, it would be available before court, at court, or
after court.329 The content exists and could be distilled from other
source materials.330 One could even use Supreme Court language
(some of which was discussed earlier) to frame the brief introduction
to the jury role.331 This educational project need not be run by court
systems, but could be hosted by local bar associations, non-profit
organizations, or law schools. If courts wanted to control the material,
they could include educational links in their jury summons or in any
follow-up jury correspondence.332
information to prospective jurors before trial, thus increasing their familiarity with the
legal system and the case at hand, may improve their performance during the actual
trial.”).
327
Some judges choose to explain this history on their own initiative. Kim FordeMazuri, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representation,
52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 364 (1999) (“Trial judges have long recognized the educational
importance of jury service, taking the opportunity to teach the jurors about the
responsibility of civic virtue and self-government.”).
328
See CLARK, supra note 294, at 50 (“A jury service video should be professionally
produced and geared for the average citizen who knows little about jury service. This
film is not meant to be an orientation video, but instead should be educational,
designed for schools and civic groups. It should be approximately 10 to 15 minutes
and include such things as the historical origin, types of cases, trial stages, the jury’s
role and how jurors are selected, and close with a meaningful message pointing out
how important jury service is to the American judicial system.”).
329
The federal district court in Massachusetts has begun a project to film jury
instructions and other parts of the juror’s experience and to provide those videos to all
citizens on its website. U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Mass., Boston: Judge Information: Young,
William G., USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/young.htm (last
visited Dec. 28, 2013).
330
The American Judicature Society maintains an extensive public education
website about juries. Am. Judicature Soc., Homepage, AJS.ORG, http://www.ajs.org/
jc/index.php/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). The American Bar Association also has
many publically available materials to educate jurors about jury service. Comm’n on the
Am. Jury Project, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/
american_jury.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
331
Ferguson, supra note 9, at 288-96, app.
332
See CLARK, supra note 294, at 5 (recommending that “[g]eneric public service
announcements (PSAs) regarding jury service should be produced for statewide
dissemination” and that “Poster/Billboard campaigns should be organized around the
same theme or slogan as the PSAs”). One difficulty for courts controlling an
interactive space of communication is that it would be both expensive to monitor and
difficult to manage. Certainly, courts would not want inflammatory or prejudicial
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Complementing this technological approach could be a courtsponsored education project in communities.333 This could be done
through written materials or in person at the local courthouse, in
schools, libraries, or public events. The constitutional basis of jury
trials is a topic of relevance (if not obvious excitement) for citizens.
While no one is proposing “jury duty lectures” about abstract
constitutional principles, every year there are several high profile jury
trials that gain national attention.334 These trials capture the interest of
the public, and also provide a teaching moment for a deeper
discussion on the role of the jury. Such media and cultural
opportunities are present, although currently underutilized to discuss
the constitutional role of juries outside the actual jury process.335
Adapting media stories about juries to constitutional discussions about
juries would be an easy and engaging way to reconnect the
constitutional identity of juries to their everyday practice.336

materials to be associated with the court system. Thus, it may be better to have any
interactive space be located in an independent institution.
333
See Chomos et al., supra note 284, at 711 (“It is vital the courts and government
work together to educate the American population about the importance of jury
service and the history behind this civic duty.”); State of Connecticut Judicial Branch
Jury Administration Jury Outreach Program, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/
jury/outreach.pdf (“The Jury Outreach Program offers Connecticut students and
communities an opportunity to learn about one of the most important components of
our system of justice. The program, which began in 2003, ensures that more people
understand the role of jury service in a free society under law. Our speakers have
visited over 215 high schools and community organizations throughout Connecticut
and conducted nearly 13,000 presentations in front of well over 40,000 people.”).
334
Cable news devotes significant airtime to the trials of celebrities and scandalous
criminal cases. Newspapers regularly cover local trials. From 12 Angry Men to Law and
Order, we are entertained by the efforts of ordinary citizens resolving the most elemental
of human conflicts. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Zimmerman Trial and the
Meaning of Verdicts, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2013/07/the-zimmerman-trial-and-the-meaning-of-verdicts/277724/;
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Why the George Zimmerman Trial’s All Female Jury Is News,
ATLANTIC (June 21, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/whythe-george-zimmerman-trials-all-female-jury-is-news/277103/.
335
See WASHINGTON STATE JURY COMMISSION, supra note 308, at Executive Summary
ix (“Every opportunity should be taken to educate the public on the importance of
jury service and to increase diversity on juries by extensive outreach to targeted
communities. The implementation committee should coordinate efforts to accomplish
this.”).
336
See id. at Recommendations 5 (“Public service campaigns should promote jury
duty using a variety of media including radio, television, newspapers, and other means
of public advertising, such as public transit, schools, court facilities, and local
stores.”).
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Of course, teaching about the jury may not be enough. Like the jury
experience itself, success results from the transformative effect of
participation in the process.337 Successful juries are engaged, impartial,
deliberative, diverse, and clearly informed of the principles structuring
the decision.338 For the potentiality of jury service to work, those same
characteristics should guide any discussion of the constitutional role
of the jury. Deliberative debates, discussions, seminars in local
courthouses and law schools would be avenues to educate the pool of
potential jurors about constitutional identity.
2.

Informal Juror Networks

The second proposed approach would focus on networks of
individuals with prior jury experience. This approach would involve
experienced jurors sharing reflections and insights about the role of
the jury with potential jurors. This network could grow organically
through community or social media, and while it is likely such a
group might need to be coordinated in some institutional manner,
perhaps through civic organizations or bar associations, this network
would provide three benefits in developing an ongoing juror identity.
First, a group of experienced jurors educating potential jurors about
jury service would provide a mutually reinforcing educational
experience.339 Experienced jurors could explain why juries matter to
potential jurors, which in turn will necessitate those jurors to think
about and learn why jury service matters to them. Potential jurors will
be provided context about the role of the jury such that they are better
prepared for the experience. As discussed, this idea of experienced
jurors instructing new jurors is not new, and had been the practice in
some states.
Second, this group of experienced jurors would, by definition,
extend the time of jury service beyond the time in the courthouse.
Asking jurors to contribute to jury service after their formal service
has ended necessarily expands the responsibilities of the juror. Both
symbolically and practically, jurors would be contributing to a
conception of jury service that focuses on before and after the
courthouse experience. The idea of juror identity along a continuum
of civic life is thus encouraged and strengthened.

337

See, e.g., KALVEN, JR. & ZEISEL, supra note 87, at 3-4.
It also helps that jurors are locked in a room unable to leave or be distracted by
family or modern technologies.
339
See supra Part III.B.2.
338
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Third, by giving experienced jurors an opportunity to discuss jury
service, you also create a new public voice to support the institution of
the jury. As discussed, one of the reasons why jury service is generally
maligned in the public’s perception is that there are few positive
stories to emerge from jury service. Jurors who have a positive
experience are provided no forum to discuss this positive experience.
Courts do not encourage jurors to talk about their experiences. There
is no institutional space. Thus, the positive voices of jury experience
get lost. Creating a space for jurors to talk about their experience
within the jury process will provide a new voice in the dialogue about
the worth of juries to society.
This imagined network need not be actual interpersonal meetings as
social media technologies exist to allow this dialogue through other
mediums. Virtually or in person, encouraging a dialogue about jury
service after it has formally ended may well alter the image of the juror
in society.
CONCLUSION
The potentiality of jury service offers a new way to conceptualize
the role of the juror in society today. Throughout history, jury service
has been a moment of “constitutional translation” — when ideals
become reality through the practice of citizens. Jury service presents a
focused moment of constitutional relevancy and participation. Every
year approximately 15% of American citizens receive a jury
summons.340 Over a third of all Americans serve on a jury in their
lifetime.341 Many citizens serve more than once. Yet, even in
jurisdictions in which jury summons are a regular occurrence, most
people consider jury duty a discrete event to be experienced and then
put aside, not incorporated into their identity.342 Jurors plan to focus
their attentions during the necessary time, not before, not after, and
probably (deep down) hope to escape the process altogether.343 Jury
340

MIZE ET AL., supra note 227, at 8.
Id.
342
In Washington, D.C., jurors receive summons almost every two years. This
additional level of summonsing does not appear to affect the level of juror excitement
or involvement in any positive way. See Kathryn Alfisi, Conversation with Judge
Satterfield, WASH. LAW. (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/
publications/washington-lawyer/articles/april-2012-chief-judge.cfm (“I want to try to
do more for our citizens who are required to come to the courthouse for jury
service. . . . As of now we call in people every two years.”).
343
See Fowler, supra note 237, at 13; Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American
Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 61-63 (2001); Paul W. Rebein, Victor E. Schwartz &
341
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service need not be so cabined to the task in court. As a historical
reality and as an American ideal, the jury has played a broader, more
encompassing role in the American identity. This ideal embraces the
potentiality of citizen engagement based on an understanding of the
jury’s constitutional role. Only by re-conceiving jury service to reflect
this constitutional role can we reclaim the power of the juror in
America.
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